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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopted on 17 June
1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came
into force in Finland on 24 October 1996.
In the first report, the implementation of each of the Articles 4 and 6 to 19 of the Convention was
separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation it was concluded that
• the Finnish nuclear and radiation regulations fulfil the obligations of the Convention
• the Finnish regulatory infrastructure is in compliance with the Convention obligations
• the regulatory and licensee practices comply with the Convention obligations.
It was concluded in the first report that Finland had implemented the obligations of the Convention.
Also the objectives of the Convention were complied with.
The principle in Finland has been a continuous fulfilment of the criteria presented in the Articles of the
Convention and further enhancement of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Issues that required
measures to further enhance nuclear safety in Finland were discussed in the first report. In addition,
some new issues requiring measures were identified during the First Review Meeting.
A full scope IRRT mission was conducted by IAEA in Finland in March 2000. It resulted in recommen-
dations that will improve regulatory activities when implemented according to a prepared action plan.
The second report focuses especially on the changes related to the regulatory control infrastructure
under the scope of the Convention Articles. The report includes also issues identified in the First
Review Meeting and during the IRRT mission and subsequent measures and development activities.
Based on the evaluation done during the preparation of the second report, it can be concluded that
Finnish regulations and practices continue to be in compliance with the obligations of the Convention.
Finnish 1st and 2nd national reports to the Convention as well as Finnish legislation and other
regulations are available on STUK’s Internet site at http://www.stuk.fi.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention
was evaluated in the first report. It was concluded
that Finland had implemented the obligations of
the Convention. The objectives of the Convention
are also complied with.
The second report focuses on the changes relat-
ed to the regulatory control infrastructure and
nuclear safety under the scope of the Convention
Articles. The report also includes matters that
were identified during the first evaluation and
review meeting to require further measures to
enhance safety in Finland and also the results of
international missions and self-assessments con-
ducted after the First Review Meeting. These
issues and their consequent measures in Finland
are discussed in this report under each Article.
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants:
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa
plant has two VVER units, operated by Fortum
Power and Heat Oy (former Imatran Voima Oy),
and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units, operated
by Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). The Loviisa
units were connected to the electrical grid in 1977
(unit 1) and 1980 (unit 2) and the Olkiluoto units 1
and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respectively. The nominal
thermal power of both Loviisa units is 1500 MW.
The Operating Licenses of the Loviisa units are
valid until the end of 2007. The nominal thermal
power of both Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW. The
Operating Licenses of the Olkiluoto units are
valid until the end of 2018. According to the
conditions of the Olkiluoto license, the licensee
shall carry out an intermediate safety assessment
by the end of 2008. This assessment will be
reviewed by STUK. At both sites there are fresh
and spent fuel storage facilities, and facilities for
the storage and final disposal of low and medium
level radioactive wastes.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy applied at the end of
2000 for a Decision in Principle for a fifth reactor
unit in Finland. The licensing process is going on.
In preparation for the Decision in Principle by the
Council of State in this matter, statements were
collected from all stakeholder groups by the end of
March 2001. The Decision in Principle by the
Council of State needs to be confirmed by simple
majority of the Parliament according to the Finn-
ish licensing process.
In the Vienna Diplomatic Conference in 1994
Finland informed that it observes the principles of
the Convention, when applicable, also in uses of
nuclear energy other than nuclear power plants,
e.g. research reactors and facilities for nuclear
wastes. In Finland, such facilities are the TRIGA
Mark II research reactor (250 kW) in Espoo and
the final disposal facilities for low and medium
level radioactive waste at the Olkiluoto and Lovii-
sa plant sites. The TRIGA Mark II reactor was
taken into operation in 1962 and the disposal
facilities at Olkiluoto in 1992 and at Loviisa in
1998. The Operating License of the TRIGA reactor
was renewed in 1999 and it is valid until the end
of 2011. The new license was issued after a com-
prehensive safety review.
Spent fuel from the Olkiluoto plant has been
stored in the intermediate storage facility at the
plant site. Earlier, at the Loviisa plant, spent fuel
was stored in the storage of the plant for some
years, after which it was transported to Russia.
Due to the changes made in the Nuclear Energy
Act in 1994, the spent fuel generated in Finland
has nowadays to be treated, stored and disposed
of in Finland. Accordingly, spent fuel shipments to
Russia were terminated at the end of 1996 and
Fortum Power and Heat Oy constructed addition-
al spent fuel storage capacity at the Loviisa site.
The research into development and planning of
spent fuel disposal as well as its later implemen-
tation is carried out by Posiva Oy, a company
owned by the Finnish nuclear power plant utili-
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ties. In this final disposal programme, the first
licensing step has recently been completed. Posi-
va’s application for the Decision in Principle was
approved, after STUK’s safety review, by the pro-
posed host municipality in January 2000, by the
Council of State in December 2000 and by the
Parliament in May 2001. The next step will be the
construction of an underground research facility
at the Olkiluoto site and further research and
development work prior to the submittal of a
construction license application.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the changes made
and ongoing or planned development activities
under the areas of Articles 6 to 19 of the Conven-
tion are reported. If there are no relevant changes
made after the First Review Meeting or ongoing or
planned development under the scope of the Arti-
cle, reference to the first report is given.
In the First Review Meeting, the following
recommendations on the second Finnish national
report were given:
• information on methods used at Finnish
nuclear power plants, regulatory body and ot-
her related organisations to enhance safety
culture (see Annex IV),
• continued reporting on how the regulatory body
and operators benefit from the exchange of
experience with other countries operating simi-
lar plants (see Article 19 and Annexes II and
III),
• evaluation of the possible prescriptive features
of the regulatory system and assessment of
their impact on the development on safety (see
Article 7 and Annex I),
• presentation on plant modernisation program-
mes (see Annexes II and III).
These issues are discussed in this report as indi-
cated in the brackets above.
Taking into account the discussions and obser-
vations in the First Review Meeting, a list of items
requiring further actions in Finland was prepared
(see Chapter 4). These items are also discussed in
this report.
An IRRT team of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluated in spring 2000
STUK’s effectiveness as an authority in ensuring
nuclear and radiation safety. The results of the
mission are presented in the IRRT report, which
is available on STUK’s Internet site. In the report,
STUK’s expertise was fully recognised. In addi-
tion, developed legislation, STUK’s comprehen-
sive quality assurance programme, nuclear and
radiation safety research and emergency prepar-
edness were reported as good practices. Some
valuable recommendations and suggestions for
the further enhancement of regulatory activities
related to nuclear safety were also given. For
example, attention was paid to the adequacy of
internal procedures for enforcement activities and
possible prescriptive features of the Finnish safe-
ty regulations. However, none of the issues were
found to be serious enough for immediate correc-
tive measures in Finland. A special action plan
was prepared to take care of the identified defi-
ciencies.
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2.1 Article-by-article review
Article 4. Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the
framework of its national law, the legislative, reg-
ulatory and administrative measures and other
steps necessary for implementing its obligations
under this Convention.
The legislative, regulatory and other measures to
fulfil the obligations of the Convention were dis-
cussed in detail in the first report. It was conclud-
ed that the Finnish regulatory framework fulfils
the obligations of the Convention, and also the
objectives of the Convention are complied with.
The approach in Finland is a continuous fulfil-
ment of the criteria presented in the Articles of
the Convention. This approach of a continuous im-
provement of safety is also manifested in the Finn-
ish nuclear legislation.
During the First Review Meeting some issues
were identified to require measures to further
enhance safety in Finland. Also international mis-
sions and self-assessments conducted after the
First Review Meeting have resulted in recommen-
dations that will improve safety in Finland when
implemented according to specific action plans.
These issues and the subsequent measures in
Finland are discussed in this report under Articles
6 to19.
Article 6. Existing nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention
enters into force for that Contracting Party is
reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in
the context of this Convention, the Contracting
Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable
improvements are made as a matter of urgency
to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation.
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans
should be implemented to shut down the nuclear
installation as soon as practically possible. The
timing of the shutdown may take into account
the whole energy context and possible alterna-
tives as well as the social, environmental and
economic impact.
The safety of both Finnish nuclear power plants
was extensively reviewed during 1997 and 1998,
when operating licenses were renewed as de-
scribed in the first report. The next comprehen-
sive safety evaluations will be done in 2006–2009.
Meanwhile, the enhancement of safety of the
Finnish nuclear power plants is based on the re-
sults of continuous safety assessments. This com-
prises the results of deterministic and probabilis-
tic safety assessments, safety research, periodic
inspection programmes, analyses of operating ex-
perience and topical inspections. The continuous
safety assessment and enhancement approach is
based on the Finnish nuclear legislation (Council
of State Decision (395/1991), Section 27) where it
is stated that operating experience from nuclear
power plants as well as results of safety research
shall be systematically followed and assessed. For
further safety enhancement, actions shall be taken
which can be regarded as justified considering op-
erating experience and the results of safety re-
search as well as the advancement of science and
technology. The implementation of safety improve-
ments has been a continuing process at both Finn-
ish nuclear power plants since their commission-
ing and there exists no urgent need to upgrade the
safety of these plants in the context of the Con-
vention. Recently implemented and ongoing safe-
ty upgrading measures, mostly related to the miti-
2 COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLES 4
AND 6 TO 19
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gation of severe accidents at the nuclear power
plants, are described in more detail in Annexes II
and III.
In addition to the continuous regulatory safety
assessment, there have been independent safety
reviews conducted by WANO at both Finnish
nuclear power plants after the First Review Meet-
ing (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant at the end of
1999 and Loviisa nuclear power plant at the
beginning of 2001).
The safety of the Finnish research reactor
(TRIGA Mark II 250 kW pool reactor) was re-
viewed before its operating license was renewed
in 1999. The new license is valid until the end of
2011. Until that time, the safety of the TRIGA
reactor is continuously reviewed according to
STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
Article 7. Legislative and regulatory
framework
Each Contracting Party shall establish and main-
tain a legislative and regulatory framework to
govern the safety of nuclear installations.
The legislative and regulatory framework shall
provide for:
• the establishment of applicable national safe-
ty requirements and regulations;
• a system of licensing with regard to nuclear
installations and the prohibition of the opera-
tion of a nuclear installation without a li-
cence;
• a system of regulatory inspection and assess-
ment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and
the terms of licences;
• the enforcement of applicable regulations and
of the terms of licences, including suspen-
sion, modification or revocation.
The legislative and regulatory framework in Fin-
land was described in detail in the first report.
There have been no major changes. However, the
following minor changes are reported in the con-
text of Convention Article 7.
Legislative and regulatory framework
The nuclear energy legislation has been amended
to take into account the changes made in the na-
tional pressure equipment legislation (1999). Ear-
lier the legislation for pressure equipment in con-
ventional facilities was used as the basis, as far it
was applicable, for the regulatory control of pres-
sure equipment in nuclear facilities. However, af-
ter implementing the European Council Directive
97/23/EC of 29 May 1997, on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States concerning pres-
sure equipment, there was a need to provide a
basis for the control of pressure equipment of nu-
clear facilities directly in the nuclear legislation.
This was due to the fact, that the above Directive
explicitly excludes nuclear related pressure equip-
ment from its scope. These amendments to nucle-
ar energy legislation (the Nuclear Energy Act and
the Nuclear Energy Decree) did not have any es-
sential effect on the scope or procedures of the
regulatory control of nuclear safety related pres-
sure equipment.
The Nuclear Energy Act has been amended
(2000) to implement the new additional protocols
of the IAEA Safeguards Agreements under the
International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for expanding the safe-
guards control. This amendment will be set into
force after all procedural requirements concerning
notifications by EURATOM have been met.
The radiation protection legislation (the Radia-
tion Act and the Radiation Decree) has been
amended (1999) to implement the European Coun-
cil Directives 96/29 EURATOM of 13 May 1996,
laying down basic safety standards for the protec-
tion of the health of workers and the general
public against the dangers arising from ionising
radiation, and 97/43/Euratom of 30 June 1997, on
the protection of the health of individuals against
the dangers of ionising radiation in relation to
medical exposure.
The Council of State has issued a new decision
for the general regulations on the safety of the
disposal of spent fuel (1999). Finland has accepted
the International Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management.
The Act on Rescue Services and the subsequent
Decree have been totally revised in 1999. The
earlier rescue service legislation was combined
with the civil defence legislation. The roles and
duties of authorities in the area of emergency
preparedness of nuclear facilities were not
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 1 0
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changed.
In the area of administrative legislation the
new Publicity Act was issued in 1999. The new act
supports the principles of transparency and open-
ness in regulatory actions and, furthermore, real-
ises the constitutional right of citizens to partici-
pate in decision making on environmental mat-
ters. In practice, the new law provides the citizens
with a better access to regulatory documents in
the preparation phase, and also requires, that the
authorities actively inform the citizens on matters
under preparation.
The regulatory guides prepared and issued by
STUK are being continuously re-evaluated for
updating. The general rule stemming from the
Quality System of STUK requires that a guide
shall first be re-evaluated after five years from its
issuance. This re-evaluation does not always lead
to a revision of the guide. However, 10 years of age
is considered a limit that automatically launches
the revision of a guide. Since 1999 safety-related
requirements have not experienced major changes
in the sense of technical content, but e.g. the
document system internal consistency in sense of
terminology and structure has been approved. In
addition, the procedures of applying new guides to
existing nuclear facilities have been focused.
As one specific development effort, a limited
self-assessment was carried out to evaluate the
consistency of requirements that apply to the
submitting of documents to STUK. The require-
ments within operational safety area were re-
viewed identifying documents to be sent to STUK
for approval or for information only. The study
concluded that the existing requirements are still
valid and well in balance with the needs of an
effective regulatory control system. A further as-
sessment covering documents in all technical and
administrative areas will be carried out in connec-
tion with a development project for Information
Management. In this project opportunities provid-
ed through modern Intranet and especially Ex-
tranet applications are being studied for use in
correspondence and document submittance be-
tween STUK and the licensees. An Extranet appli-
cation provides several possibilities to limit the
amount of paper documentation submitted to au-
thorities. Also the continuous updating of plant
documentation (e.g. FSAR) could easily be taken
care of. Discussions with the Finnish licensees on
the matter continue.
Activities to further develop and enhance the
internal consistency of the regulatory guide sys-
tem as well as to ensure the catch-all coverage of
the regulations are discussed in detail in Annex I.
Licensing procedure
The licensing procedure of nuclear facilities in
Finland is described in the nuclear legislation and
has not been changed after the First Review Meet-
ing. The so-called periodic safety reviews have
been built into the relicensing procedure. In Fin-
land the legislation allows only fixed term licens-
es, and in general a license has been issued for 10
years at a time. If the license is granted for a
longer period, an equivalent safety review will be
required as a separate license condition.
Regulatory inspections
STUK’s periodic inspection programme for nucle-
ar power plants was renewed during 1998 and
inspections in 1999 were conducted according to
the new programme consisting of altogether 30
inspections. This programme replaced the former
programme that had been in place for about 10
years. The new programme is focused more on
licensee main working processes instead of specif-
ic technically oriented areas, and is considered to
cover the most relevant areas of nuclear power
plant safety. The new programme has three levels:
safety management, main working processes and
propriety of the activities in different organisa-
tional and technical areas. The objective of the
inspection process is to assess the safety level at
the plants as well as the safety management. Pos-
sible problems at the plants and in procedures of
the operating organisations are to be recognised
as soon as possible. Special emphasis has been put
on the improved management of the entire inspec-
tion programme, including the timely conduct and
accurate reporting of results. The results of the
new programme have been good. Some develop-
ment areas (conduct of unannounced inspections,
more specific inspection procedures) were identi-
fied during the IRRT mission and by self-assess-
ment. At the moment, STUK is developing Risk
Informed Regulation practices. These include
among others use of PSA for planning regulatory
10
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inspections to focus inspections on risk significant
areas. It also includes assessment of inspection
findings by PSA.
In addition to the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, STUK conducts ad-hoc inspections if
seen necessary. In the past, these have mainly
related to operating event investigations (both
domestic and  international events), but also on
the consequences of the development of science
and technology. These inspections are usually con-
ducted by an investigation team including 3-5
experts from STUK.
Enforcement
The enforcement tools and procedures of regula-
tors have not been changed and are considered to
fully meet the needs. The repertoire of these tools
will be issued in an internal policy document as
part of STUK’s Quality System to serve for train-
ing.
Article 8. Regulatory body
Each Contracting Party shall establish or desig-
nate a regulatory body entrusted with the imple-
mentation of the legislative and regulatory frame-
work referred to in Article 7, and provided with
adequate authority, competence and financial
and human resources to fulfil its assigned re-
sponsibilities.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure an effective separation be-
tween the functions of the regulatory body and
those of any other body or organisation con-
cerned with the promotion or utilisation of nucle-
ar energy.
The regulatory system in Finland was described
in detail in the first report. The structure of the
regulatory system in Finland has not been
changed. However, some minor changes have tak-
en place after the First Review Meeting and these
are reported below.
In the area of regulatory control, the strategy
of financing the work has been reconsidered. The
earlier financing model to get the resources from
the State budget, was changed to so called net-
budgeting model. This means that the licensees
pay the regulatory control fees directly to STUK.
This approach to finance governmental regulatory
activities became a common practice in Finland in
the 1990’s. The change was carefully analysed and
discussed among the parties involved. The conclu-
sion was that considering the long traditions and
stability of the amount of regulatory control no
concern of loosing the required objectivity was
foreseen. Also it was clearly recognised that the
amounts charged would continuously be under the
control of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health. The change in the financing procedure
has not changed the actual costs of regulatory
control activities.
The organisation of the Department of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation of STUK has undergone some
changes: a new office, that of Human and Organi-
sational Factors (3 persons), has been established
to develop appropriate functional methods to over-
see the licensees’ organisation and personnel ac-
tivities. The office also co-ordinates research ac-
tivities on the effects of organisational and human
factors as well as event investigation, and devel-
ops methods to assess safety culture. The office
also gives recommendations to improve regulatory
control methods based on research results. The
other change was made to clarify and highlight
STUK’s role in the co-ordination of national and
international co-operation in nuclear safety re-
search: a new organisational unit, “Research Man-
agement” (2 persons), was established within the
Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The independence of STUK’s technical support
has been evaluated in 2000. The evaluation in-
cluded quality audits to the five research units of
the Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT,
the main technical support organisation of STUK.
The audits were performed by Qualitas Fennica
Ltd. The audits concentrated on activities and
work processes that are essential to nuclear safety
and safety related research. Independence prob-
lems were not discovered in these audits. On the
other hand, one essential element in this respect
is STUK’s in-house expertise providing independ-
ence when drawing conclusions from research
results. However, based on the audit results, the
quality systems of these research units have been
further improved taking into account STUK’s
point of view concerning the required independ-
ence from utility driven research projects. Two
follow-up audits will be conducted in October
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 1 0
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2001. A similar quality audit will be carried out at
the Geological Survey of Finland, GTK, at the end
of 2001. This means that all main support organi-
sations of STUK have then been evaluated.
Article 9. Responsibility of the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime
responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installa-
tion rests with the holder of the relevant licence
and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure
that each such licence holder meets its responsi-
bility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the
licensee as manifested in the Nuclear Energy Act.
STUK verifies that the licensee meets its respon-
sibility as described in the first review report.
These principles have not changed after the First
Review Meeting.
The existence and further maturing of this
responsibility originate from the safety culture of
the licensee organisation. The regulatory activi-
ties to support the safety culture among the Finn-
ish nuclear community are discussed in Annex IV.
The financial provisions to cover the possible
harms of a nuclear accident have been arranged
according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions.
Finland has supported the international efforts to
revise the Paris and Brussels Conventions for
Nuclear Third Party Liability in order to raise the
funds made available by the Contract Parties in
case of accidents.
Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that all organizations en-
gaged in activities directly related to nuclear in-
stallations shall establish policies that give due
priority to nuclear safety.
Safety is emphasised in the general principles of
the Nuclear Energy Act and an advanced safety
culture is required to be maintained when design-
ing, constructing and operating nuclear power
plants. These principles and priorities have not
changed after the First Review Meeting. However,
special emphasis has been put on the following
areas after the First Review Meeting.
Attention has been paid to safety culture in the
operation and maintenance of Finnish nuclear
power plants. STUK has taken an active role in
this area and both developed its own culture and
taken the initiative in the assessment and devel-
opment of the culture of the utility organisations.
This work is described in more detail in Annex IV.
At the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants,
actions have been taken to emphasise a high level
of safety culture, and to further develop it. The
licensees have established written quality and
safety policies.
Both utilities have organisational units for
safety. They are independent of those units, which
are directly responsible for the operation of the
plants. In addition to the safety units, both utili-
ties have independent safety committees with
external expert members.
Attention has also been paid to the impact of
the deregulation of energy markets to the priority
to safety. In spite of the limited expected impact of
market deregulation, there is a development
project within STUK aiming to make sure that the
periodic inspection programme continues to pro-
vide relevant information also in the deregulated
market. The project reviews the effects, which
market deregulation has had so far in Finland and
also in other countries, and how these effects
should or could have been manifested by the
inspection programme. If some areas are identi-
fied where a significant reduction in the utilities’
capability to sustain a high safety level could
occur, modifications in the inspection programme
will be made accordingly. In addition, STUK has
some indicators in its indicator system to detect
the possible impact of market deregulation on
plant safety. One is the rate of annual investment
(Figures 1 and 2). The costs of large modernisa-
tion programmes at both nuclear power plants
during 1996–2000 can be seen in these figures.
These figures are only used to trend changes over
time. Other indicators are related to trending of
the quality of maintenance activities.
STUK has updated its own Quality Policy in
1999. The Quality Policy includes also STUK’s
values that are engaged to every day work giving
the highest priority to the prevention and mitiga-
tion of the harmful effects of radiation.
12
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Article 11. Financial and human resources
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that adequate financial re-
sources are available to support the safety of
each nuclear installation throughout its life.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of
qualified staff with appropriate education, train-
ing and retraining are available for all safety-
related activities in or for each nuclear installa-
tion, throughout its life.
Adequate financial and human recourses are a
condition for the granting of a construction and
operating license according to the Nuclear Energy
Act. This shall be complied with throughout the
operation of the facility. These principles have not
changed after the First Review Meeting. However,
effects of the deregulation of the energy markets
need to be carefully followed in Finland to ensure
that adequate financial recourses are available to
support safety. STUK has a development project
for this issue as described under Article 10.
In spring 2000, the Ministry of Trade and
Industry set up a working group to analyse the
contents and scope of the know-how required to
continue the safe operation of nuclear power
plants. The task of the group was to identify the
measures needed during a period of five to ten
years to maintain the high level of expertise
despite changes in the operating environment
Figure 1. The annual rate of investments at Olkiluoto.
Figure 2. The annual rate of investments at Loviisa.
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such as deregulation of the energy market and the
growing turnover of personnel due to the retire-
ment of many experts. The group also assessed
which of the services required could be provided
through international co-operation. Another task
of the group was to estimate the need to train new
experts and to propose measures ensuring that a
sufficient number of highly skilled experts would
be trained. The study indicates that in general the
availability of the services needed and the level of
expertise are sufficient today. However, the re-
source basis is very narrow in some fields of
competence, and in some cases special measures
are called for in the next 5 to 10 years. The most
critical fields will be reactor physics and dynam-
ics, fires, human and organisational factors and
programmable automation. Also areas such as
severe accidents and ageing require special atten-
tion and financial resources in the future. Howev-
er, the uncertainties related to the continuation of
the public funding of nuclear safety research could
have some effect on the attractiveness of the
research field to young experts. The age distribu-
tion of personnel working in organisations in the
nuclear energy sector indicates that the need for
new experts will increase two- or even three-fold
within the next five to ten years due to retire-
ment. The current training capacity of universi-
ties is adequate to meet this need.
STUK has paid special attention to the strate-
gy for personnel development and to ensuring
sufficient amount of experts in the utility organi-
sations. Both utilities have a systematic approach
to training. However, changes in energy markets
and the fast development of technology will bring
new challenges to the knowledge, and this re-
quires special emphasis of all parties.
Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limi-
tations of human performance are taken into ac-
count throughout the life of a nuclear installa-
tion.
Section 19 of the Decision of the Council of State
(395/1991) requires special attention to be paid to
the avoidance, detection and correction of human
errors. This applies to the design, construction and
operation of the facility. These requirements have
not changed after the First Review Meeting. Re-
cently STUK has paid special attention to the as-
sessment of human and organisational factors in
abnormal events and transients and working proc-
esses in the nuclear power plants. A separate or-
ganisational unit has been established and exper-
tise in behavioural science has been recruited as
described under Article 8.
Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that quality assurance pro-
grammes are established and implemented with
a view to providing confidence that specified re-
quirements for all activities important to nuclear
safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nucle-
ar installation.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Decree, a quality
assurance programme for the design, construction
and operation of the nuclear facility needs to be
submitted to STUK when applying for a construc-
tion and operating license. According to Section 5
of the Decision of the Council of State (395/1991),
a quality assurance programme shall be employed
in all activities that affect safety, from design to
operation. Quality assurance programmes have to
be established also by all other organisations tak-
ing part in safety important activities of the use of
nuclear energy. These basic requirements have not
changed after the First Review Meeting. At the
moment, STUK’s YVL Guides that set more de-
tailed requirements for quality assurance pro-
grammes are being updated. The new guides will
closely follow IAEA guidelines. In addition, both
licensees are in the process of developing their
quality systems. More information on the work
carried out by the licensees can be found in An-
nexes II and III. As described under Article 8,
STUK has also paid attention to the quality sys-
tems of its support organisations.
STUK’s Quality Manual has been prepared
and implemented since the First Review Meeting.
It includes STUK’s quality policy, description of
the quality system, organisation and manage-
ment, main and supporting working processes and
personnel policy. Numerous internal audits, self-
assessments and international evaluations have
14
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revealed development areas that are now being
tackled by STUK. In addition to STUK’s Quality
Manual, all organisational units of STUK have
their own more detailed Quality Manuals. The
Quality Manual prepared for the regulatory con-
trol of the use of nuclear energy has been bench-
marked with other regulators under the auspices
of OECD/NEA working groups and bilateral agree-
ments.
Article 14. Assessment and verification of
safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that:
• comprehensive and systematic safety assess-
ments are carried out before the construction
and commissioning of a nuclear installation
and throughout its life. Such assessments
shall be well documented, subsequently up-
dated in the light of operating experience and
significant new safety information, and re-
viewed under the authority of the regulatory
body;
• verification by analysis, surveillance, testing
and inspection is carried out to ensure that
the physical state and the operation of a nu-
clear installation continue to be in accord-
ance with its design, applicable national safe-
ty requirements, and operational limits and
conditions.
Safety assessment
Comprehensive and systematic safety assessment
is an essential part of the licensing process and
license renewal. As a condition for a license, both
deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments
(PSA) need to be carried out and submitted to
STUK for approval. Both assessments are kept up
to date throughout the operation of the nuclear
facility, reflecting the advancement of science and
technology. Any changes to these documents are
submitted to STUK for approval. These require-
ments have not changed after the First Review
Meeting.
Since the First Review Meeting, the PSAs have
been updated, and their scope has been extended
at both nuclear power plants. Plant-specific living
PSAs, including internal initiators, fires, flooding,
harsh weather conditions, seismic events for oper-
ation mode, and internal events for low power
mode, have been completed for the plants. These
PSA studies are used in support of decision mak-
ing by the regulatory body and of safety manage-
ment at the utilities. The risk-informed regulatory
scope at STUK is progressing towards Risk In-
formed In-service Inspection/In-Service Testing,
and Risk Informed Technical Specifications activi-
ties. A related study has recently been completed
by STUK.
Special attention has been paid to seismic
events in Finland, although Finland is not in a
seismically active area. Training on seismic events
(earthquakes, their origin, measurements) in Fin-
land was organised at STUK to increase aware-
ness and consideration of seismic risks at nuclear
facilities. The training included the presentation
of seismic PSAs for Finnish nuclear power plants
and the presentation of a report on seismic haz-
ards in the southern territory of Finland. Accord-
ing to the PSA results, seismic events do not cause
major risks in Finland. However, some modifica-
tions have been made at Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant, where for example the support structures of
batteries and switchgear cubicles have been im-
proved. There has been no need to implement any
specific measures regarding seismic events at
Loviisa nuclear power plant. STUK is also reas-
sessing the regulatory requirements related to
seismic events given in Guide YVL 2.6, Provision
against earthquakes affecting nuclear facilities,
that is currently under revision.
The year 2000 problem at Finnish nuclear
power plants and at regulatory body was carefully
evaluated before the millennium. Both utilities
and STUK created programmes to cope with the
problem. These included e.g. updating of some
computer programmes both at nuclear power
plants and at STUK. Utility programmes were
closely followed by STUK. During the millennium,
no problems were identified at Finnish power
nuclear plants.
Design and documentation of plant
modifications
Special attention has been paid to plant modifica-
tion processes and documentation at Finnish nu-
clear power plants. Requirements concerning mod-
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ifications designed by the utility and their inde-
pendent assessment have been reassessed and in-
cluded into appropriate YVL Guides that are now
being updated. The new requirements mean in
practice that all safety significant plant modifica-
tions have to be assessed by a unit which is inde-
pendent of the design and implementation of the
modification. The results of these assessments
have to be included in the documentation submit-
ted to the regulator.
STUK has also paid attention to the documen-
tation of plant modifications and has established
an own plant modification database, including the
whole operating history of the Finnish plants.
Based on this database, STUK produces reports
on ongoing plant modifications biannually. These
reports include all safety significant plant modifi-
cations and other important modifications. The
purpose of this report is to inform STUK’s person-
nel of the cause of each modification, technical
implementation, implementation stage, assess-
ment of safety significance and documentation
submitted to the regulatory body and possible
remarks related to the modification project.
Verification of safety
Several requirements concerning the verification
of the physical state of a nuclear power plant are
given in the Decision of the Council of State (395/
1991). More detailed requirements are given in
YVL Guides. These basic requirements have not
changed after the First Review Meeting.
As written in the first report, the qualification
of non-destructive testing (NDT) systems and pro-
cedures requires a high priority in Finland. The
implementation of qualified NDT systems has
been started in Finland. STUK has decided that
the consensus document “Common position of Eu-
ropean Regulators on qualification of NDT-sys-
tems for pre- and in-service inspection of lightwa-
ter reactor components, EUR 16802 EN” is to be
followed in Finland. ENIQ documents (European
Network for Inspection Qualification) can also be
followed. The application of the documents is still
under discussion. A national strategy document
for NDT qualification has been written. The most
important issue is that the qualification body shall
be competent and independent. Ad hoc type quali-
fication bodies have been established by the Steer-
ing Committee of NDT Qualifications. However,
this has not been an easy task due to the shortage
of independent and competent personnel in Fin-
land. The work carried out by the Finnish utilities
is described in more detail in Annex III.
Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that in all operational states
the radiation exposure to the workers and the
public caused by a nuclear installation shall be
kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no
individual shall be exposed to radiation doses
which exceed prescribed national dose limits.
Basic requirements for the safe use of nuclear en-
ergy are given in the Nuclear Energy Act. The
ALARA principle is included in the Radiation Act.
These basic requirements have not changed after
the First Review Meeting. As a consequence of the
implementation of the new European Basic Safety
Standard Directive, medical surveillance of the
employees of the nuclear power plants has been
performed since 1999 according to a practice based
on the new Directive. Otherwise the implementa-
tion of the Basic Safety Standard Directive con-
cerned mainly radiation safety regulations in Fin-
land, and caused no major changes to YVL Guides.
Environmental radiation safety
Fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear
power plants have had low failure rates (from 0 to
2 leakages during one annual operational period
of the reactors between 1998–2001). The plant op-
erators have also paid special attention to water
chemistry conditions and the proper selection of
materials, when changing primary circuit equip-
ment and components. The activity levels in the
primary circuit water have been reasonably low.
Both nuclear power plants have implemented
special measures to reduce the releases of radioac-
tive matter into the environment. The Loviisa
nuclear power plant has operated a system for
efficient Cs removal from liquid waste tanks,
where liquid waste is collected before release into
the environment. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
16
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has implemented new purification measures and
storage tanks which aim to increase water recircu-
lation in the plant processes, thus reducing the
liquid waste effluents from the plant.
Sections 7 to 12 of the Decision of the Council
of State (395/1991) include regulations for limiting
the radiation exposure of the general public and
the releases of radioactive materials into the envi-
ronment. Radioactive releases into the environ-
ment of the Finnish nuclear power plants have
been well below authorised limits (for important
nuclides and pathways, of the order of 0.01 to 1%
of set values based on the requirements of Guides
YVL 7.2, YVL 7.3 and YVL 7.6). The limit for the
dose commitment of an individual of the popula-
tion, arising from the normal operation of a nucle-
ar power plant in any period of one year, is 0.1
mSv (395/1991, section 9). Calculated radiation
exposures to the critical groups in the environ-
ment of the nuclear power plants are shown in
Figure 3.
Environmental radiation monitoring in the vi-
cinity of nuclear power plants has been compre-
hensive and has been implemented according to
the requirements of Guide YVL 7.7. The experi-
ence from the surveillance will be taken into
account when the nuclear power utilities propose
a new monitoring programme for approval to be
implemented 2003–2007.
Figure 3. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment of
the Finnish nuclear power plants.
Figure 4. Two year average of collective radiation doses at Finnish nuclear power plant units.
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Radiation protection of workers
According to Guide YVL 7.9, the collective radia-
tion dose to the personnel should not exceed the
value 2.5 manSv per 1 GW of net electrical capaci-
ty averaged over two successive years at one plant
unit. If the value is exceeded, the cause of the
excessive dose and the measures which may be
required to improve radiation protection are to be
reported to STUK. The two year average of collec-
tive radiation doses to Finnish nuclear power
plant workers since 1978 is shown in Figure 4.
Guide YVL 7.9 has been in force since 1993 and
some limit exceeding have occurred as can be seen
in the figure. According to Section 3 of the Radia-
tion Decree (1512/1991), the effective dose caused
by radiation work to a worker must not exceed 20
millisieverts (mSv) per year as an average over
five years, or 50 mSv in any single year. Individu-
al annual worker doses have been below 20 mSv
(see Figure 5 for the years 1998–2000) and the
maximum dose to a Finnish nuclear power plant
worker in the five year period of 1996–2000 was
93.2 mSv.
As specified in the operating strategy of each
plant, there has been an extensive annual mainte-
nance outage every second year at each plant unit.
These outages have resulted in doses somewhat
higher than have shorter outages in between, as
can be seen in Figure 4. For example in 1998,
large modernisation and power uprating projects
were finalised at both nuclear power plants.
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants have
agreed on the implementation of plant-specific
ALARA programmes.
In addition, Loviisa nuclear power plant has a
project for the renewal of the installed radiation
monitoring systems (area monitors, air monitors,
process monitors and effluent monitors) at the
plant during 2001–2002.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-
site emergency plans that are routinely tested for
nuclear installations and cover the activities to
be carried out in the event of an emergency. For
any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be
prepared and tested before it commences opera-
tion above a low power level agreed by the regula-
tory body.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are like-
ly to be affected by a radiological emergency, its
own population and the competent authorities of
the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installa-
tion are provided with appropriate information
for emergency planning and response.
Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear
installation on their territory, insofar as they are
likely to be affected in the event of a radiological
emergency at a nuclear installation in the vicini-
ty, shall take the appropriate steps for the prepa-
ration and testing of emergency plans for their
territory that cover the activities to be carried
out in the event of such an emergency.
The basic regulations for on-site emergency plan-
ning are given in the Nuclear Energy Act and in
the Decision of the Council of State (397/1991).
Off-site emergency plans required by the Rescue
legislation (561/1999) are prepared by the local
authorities. These basic requirements have not
changed after the First Review Meeting. However,
emergency response procedures at Olkiluoto and
Loviisa nuclear power plants have been further
developed based on the requirements of Guide
YVL 7.4. These procedures have been regularly
tested in annual emergency exercises that are part
of the plants’ emergency preparedness training.
STUK has approved changes to the emergency
Figure 5. Distribution of individual annual worker
doses.
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plans of nuclear power plants, and carries out an
inspection every year to assess the emergency pre-
paredness regime, including emergency training
and exercises.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency
exercises held annually on each nuclear power
plant site, STUK has taken part e.g. in interna-
tional emergency exercises such as INEX 2/Cana-
da in 1999 and INEX 2000/France in 2001. STUK
has also participated as a co-player in emergency
exercises arranged by the Swedish nuclear power
plants and authorities. In September 2000, a na-
tional emergency and rescue exercise of the entire
Government organisation was carried out in Fin-
land. Part of the exercise scenario was based on a
Loviisa nuclear power plant accident scenario and
exercise.
As regards emergency preparedness, special
attention has been paid by both Finnish nuclear
power plants to the classification of emergencies
(an emergency-stand-by situation), accident man-
agement and the development of the emergency
instructions of on-site emergency centres and sup-
porting expert groups, the use of real-time dosim-
eters by emergency workers on site, and imple-
mentation of automatic alerting of plant personnel
during emergency situations. Also updated guide-
lines and information related to emergency situa-
tions have been distributed to the public living in
the vicinity of the nuclear power plants.
STUK has developed and implemented a new
information system (USVA) for the automatic ra-
diation monitoring network in Finland in 1999. In
addition, the development of a new transportation
and dose calculation model (VALMA) for STUK is
underway in Finland.
Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures
are established and implemented:
• for evaluating all relevant site-related factors
likely to affect the safety of a nuclear instal-
lation for its projected lifetime;
• for evaluating the likely safety impact of a
proposed nuclear installation on individuals,
society and the environment;
• for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant
factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and
(ii) so as to ensure the continued safety ac-
ceptability of the nuclear installation;
• for consulting Contracting Parties in the vi-
cinity of a proposed nuclear installation, in-
sofar as they are likely to be affected by that
installation and, upon request providing the
necessary information to such Contracting
Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate
and make their own assessment of the likely
safety impact on their own territory of the
nuclear installation.
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power
plant and for an environmental impact assess-
ment are provided in the Nuclear Energy Decree.
These requirements were presented in detail in
the first review report and they have not changed
after the First Review Meeting. In 2000, STUK
issued a new Guide YVL 1.10, Safety criteria for
siting a nuclear power plant. It describes general-
ly all requirements concerning the site and sur-
roundings of a nuclear power plant, gives require-
ments on safety factors affecting site selection as
well as covers regulatory control during all licens-
ing phases (Decision in Principle, Construction li-
cense, Operating license).
STUK issued to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry statements on the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) reports of the planned ‘Loviisa 3
nuclear power plant project’ and ‘Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant extension project’ in 1999. STUK
assessed the reports from a radiation and nuclear
safety point of view. The following issues, among
others, were assessed: how the applicants fulfil
current radiation safety requirements, releases of
radioactive matters during normal operation and
during a severe accident situation. STUK also
assessed the estimated environmental impacts of
fuel procurement and nuclear waste management.
Based on the Espoo-treaty (Convention on Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment in a Transbounda-
ry Context, Espoo 1991), Finland also received
statements on the EIA from neighbouring coun-
tries (Estonia, Sweden and Russia; although Rus-
sia has not ratified the Espoo-treaty it was given a
possibility to give its statement on the EIA).
In the statements, no factors emerged concern-
ing environmental radiation safety that would
prevent the construction of a new reactor on the
existing sites of Olkiluoto or Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plants. Each site is very remote to population
and there are no large industrial facilities or
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transport routes near the sites. The most signifi-
cant environmental impacts of a possible new
reactor would arise from cooling water discharges
increasing the temperature of sea water in the
vicinity of the nuclear power plant.
STUK has made a safety assessment in early
2001 of the fifth reactor unit, based on the applica-
tion by Teollisuuden Voima Oy for a Decision in
Principle. In this assessment a review of the
proposed siting of the new reactor, alternatively to
Olkiluoto or Loviisa, was done. Both sites were
considered to be appropriate for a new reactor of
the proposed size of 1000–1600 MW electric pow-
er. A statement in favour of the new nuclear power
plant was given also by each candidate site munic-
ipality. In addition, based on the Treaty (on guide-
lines for communication in case of near border
siting of nuclear facilities, 1977) between the Nor-
dic Countries, also Sweden gave its favourable
statement on the application for a Decision in
Principle.
Article 18. Design and construction
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that:
• the design and construction of a nuclear in-
stallation provides for several reliable levels
and methods of protection (defense in depth)
against the release of radioactive materials,
with a view to preventing the occurrence of
accidents and to mitigating their radiological
consequences should they occur;
• the technologies incorporated in the design
and construction of a nuclear installation are
proven by experience or qualified by testing
or analysis;
• the design of a nuclear installation allows for
reliable, stable and easily manageable opera-
tion, with specific consideration of human
factors and the man-machine interface.
Defense in depth
According to the Decision of the Council of State
(395/1991), several levels of protection have to be
provided in the design of a nuclear power plant.
The design of the nuclear facility and the technol-
ogy used is assessed by STUK when reviewing the
application for a Decision in Principle, Construc-
tion License and Operating License. Design is re-
assessed against the advancement of science and
technology, when the Operating License is re-
newed. Requirements related to the defence in
depth and its application were presented in detail
in the first review report. These have not changed
after the First Review Meeting. However, as it
was written in the first report, severe accidents
still need further attention in Finland. Improve-
ments have been implemented to enhance the
safety of the plants and to mitigate the conse-
quences of severe accidents. Some of the work is
going on and is described in more detail in Annex-
es II and III.
Proven technology
The requirement to use proven or otherwise quali-
fied technology is stated in the Decision of the
Council of State (395/1991). Detailed requirements
are provided in several YVL Guides. Digital in-
strumentation and control technology has already
been implemented in some modernised systems.
The development of detailed safety requirements
and procedures to ensure adequate reliability of
such systems is still underway.
Reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation
Requirements for control rooms, equipment and
automation and the avoidance, detection and cor-
rection of human errors are provided in the Deci-
sion of the Council of State (395/1991). These re-
quirements have not changed after the First Re-
view Meeting. Both plants are planning to mod-
ernise their control rooms. At the Loviisa nuclear
power plant this is included into a large automa-
tion modernisation project. At the Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant changes in the control room are
made gradually.
Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that:
• the initial authorisation to operate a nuclear
installation is based upon an appropriate
safety analysis and a commissioning pro-
gramme demonstrating that the installation,
as constructed, is consistent with design and
safety requirements;
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• operational limits and conditions derived
from the safety analysis, tests and operation-
al experience are defined and revised as nec-
essary for identifying safe boundaries for op-
eration;
• operation, maintenance, inspection and test-
ing of a nuclear installation are conducted in
accordance with approved procedures;
• procedures are established for responding to
anticipated operational occurrences and to
accidents;
• necessary engineering and technical support
in all safety-related fields is available
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installa-
tion;
• incidents significant to safety are reported in
a timely manner by the holder of the relevant
licence to the regulatory body;
• programmes to collect and analyse operating
experience are established, the results ob-
tained and the conclusions drawn are acted
upon and that existing mechanisms are used
to share important experience with interna-
tional bodies and with other operating organ-
isations and regulatory bodies;
• the generation of radioactive waste resulting
from the operation of a nuclear installation is
kept to the minimum practicable for the proc-
ess concerned, both in activity and in volume,
and any necessary treatment and storage of
spent fuel and waste directly related to the
operation and on the same site as that of the
nuclear installation take into consideration
conditioning and disposal.
Requirements presented in the Finnish legislation
related to operation were presented in detail in
the first report. These requirements have not
changed after the First Review Meeting. However,
some further progress has been made in the fol-
lowing areas.
Anticipated operational occurrences and
accidents
As part of its severe accident management project,
Loviisa nuclear power plant is developing new
symptom based emergency operating procedures.
The new procedures will be taken into operation
in 2005.
Engineering and technical support
Some concern was related to the adequacy of engi-
neering and technical support available to Teolli-
suuden Voima Oy when its Operating License was
renewed in 1998. This was due to the fact that,
recently, Teollisuuden Voima Oy has quite inde-
pendently designed and implemented some safety
modifications at the plant, and the tendency is
expected to continue. This issue was raised again
in a preliminary safety assessment by STUK re-
lated to the Decision in Principle for the fifth reac-
tor in Finland. It was stated that if the Decision in
Principle is approved by the Parliament, Teollisuu-
den Voima Oy should in a very early phase start to
develop its organisation and expertise to ensure
the safety of the plant in case there is no compre-
hensive design service available in the market.
There has also been some concern about how to
sustain the expertise of nuclear safety personnel
in a deregulated environment. This concern has
especially touched Fortum Engineering that has
recently exposed to divestment. However, a new
company, Fortum Nuclear Services Ltd, has been
founded and nuclear safety engineering has been
transferred to this company so that the possible
divestment of Fortum Engineering will not reduce
the nuclear safety expertise of the company.
Incident reports
STUK is updating reporting requirements to meet
today’s challenges taking into account for example
energy market deregulation. However, no major
changes are foreseen in the requirements.
Incident evaluation and international co-
operation
Special attention was paid to incident evaluation
methods and operating experience in Finland in
1999. A study was conducted by the Technical Re-
search Centre of Finland, VTT, to evaluate operat-
ing experience feedback systems and incident
evaluation methods in the Finnish nuclear indus-
try. Several development areas were identified to
enhance incident evaluation and to close the oper-
ating experience loop in order to avoid recurrence
of events. Implementation of these measures is
under way.
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Both plants co-operate with WANO and coun-
tries having similar reactor types. This co-opera-
tion is more closely described in Annexes II and
III. STUK has also participated in co-operation
between international organisations such as the
IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the EU, who exchange
information on safety issues and operating events.
Other forums that STUK uses to obtain informa-
tion are WENRA, the VVER Forum and the NERS
Forum as well as some bilateral agreements. A
special exchange of information between Gosatom-
nadzor and STUK on the operation of the Kola
and Leningrad nuclear power plants and of Finn-
ish nuclear power plants has taken place quarterly.
Radioactive wastes
Interim storage facilities for spent fuel are availa-
ble at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. Both are
wet-type storages. At both sites, additional stor-
age capacity needs to be constructed by early 2010.
Research, development and planning work for
spent fuel disposal is in progress and the disposal
facility is envisaged to be operational in early
2020. In spring 2001, the Parliament approved a
Decision in Principle on the final disposal of spent
fuel at the Olkiluoto site.
At the Loviisa site a solidification facility for
low and medium level waste will be commissioned
in the year 2004.
At both nuclear power plant sites, rock cavern
facilities for the ultimate disposal of low and
medium level waste are in operation.
2.2 Concluding summary on the
fulfilment of the obligations
The changes made and the ongoing or planned
development under the areas of the Articles 4 and
6 to 19 of the Convention are reported above.
Based on the evaluation, it can be concluded that
Finnish regulations and practices continue to be
in compliance with the obligations of the Conven-
tion, and further progress is underway.
Safety improvements have been annually im-
plemented at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since
their commissioning. There exists no urgent need
for additional improvements to upgrade the safety
of these plants in the context of the Convention.
However, there are issues requiring further meas-
ures to enhance safety. The main issues are dis-
cussed in Chapter 3.
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Safety and organisational culture
An understanding of organisational issues and
safety culture will be strengthened in Finland.
STUK has both developed its own culture and
made initiatives to assess and develop the culture
of the utilities. These assessments are under plan-
ning at the moment and, based on the results of
the studies, attention will be paid on the imple-
mentation and improvement of safety culture at
utility organisations. Studies will also strengthen
STUK’s and the utilities’ competence to assess or-
ganisational issues and personnel behaviour.
Changing environment
Deregulation of the electricity markets took place
in steps since the new Act on Electrical Power
Markets came into force in Finland in 1995. From
1998 on, free competition has existed in all sectors
of the market, except transmission in the national
grid and local distribution of power. During the
past five years, many changes have taken place in
the ownership of the utilities, including some
changes in the ownership of the nuclear power
plants, in Finland. So far, no negative impacts
have been seen to the nuclear safety. However,
due to competition some savings are in sight in
the maintenance costs for example in the use of
contractors and possibly by risk informed and op-
timised approach to maintenance. Possible nega-
tive impacts to nuclear safety need to be carefully
observed by the regulator.
3 PLANNED ACTIVITIES TO
IMPROVE SAFETY
The Finnish regulatory control system includes both periodic safety review
and continuous safety review processes. Actions for safety enhancement are
to be taken whenever they can be regarded as justified, considering operat-
ing experience, the results of safety research and the advancement of
science and technology. In the following some specific issues and challeng-
es for future work in Finland are presented.
Human resources in the nuclear field
Based on the evaluation of human resources in
Finland in the nuclear field, there is a narrow
resource basis in some fields of core competencies
such as reactor physics and dynamics, fires, hu-
man and organisational factors and programma-
ble automation. Further measures are required in
these areas during the next 5 to 10 years in order
to avoid loosing competence. In practice it means
educating and hiring new people on these areas.
Qualification of non-destructive testing
The reliability of NDT systems taking into account
also the small amount of independent and compe-
tent personnel resources requires special atten-
tion in Finland. International activities and co-
operation will be closely followed.
Reliability of digital automation
Detailed safety requirements and procedures to
ensure adequate reliability of digital instrumenta-
tion and control systems need to be defined in
Finland. International activities and co-operation
in this area will be closely followed in Finland.
Operating experience feedback
There is still room for enhancement of operating
experience feedback activities in order to avoid
recurrence of operating events. Implementation of
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recommendations based on the research carried
out on operating experience activities in the Finn-
ish nuclear industry is most essential.
Provision for plant ageing
Ageing issues in Finnish nuclear power plants
have already been addressed. However, recent op-
erating experience has shown that this area re-
quires further attention. It is also recognised that
ageing effects will reveal technical challenges in
the future for which there need to be expertise
available to cope with potential problems. The is-
sue of ageing has also been included into the na-
tional Finnish research programme on nuclear
power plant safety (FINNUS).
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The Convention on Nuclear Safety is the first le-
gally binding international instrument for nuclear
safety in countries that have ratified it. The con-
tent of the Convention is consistent and covers
well the safety concerns connected to the use of
nuclear energy. The Convention calls for regular
reporting on how its various articles have been
implemented in the participating countries and
communities.
In Finland the Convention was cordially wel-
comed, and Finland was also among the first
signatories of it. Based on the experience gained
during and after the First Review Meeting in
1999, it can be said that this international legal
instrument can be—and it is foreseen to be case
also in future—a very powerful tool for enhancing
the safety of the nuclear community.
In Finland the Convention and the review
mechanism included in it are considered fruitful
i.a. for the following reasons:
• The preparation of the national reports requi-
res a certain amount of self-evaluation. Some
shortages and development needs of the own
regulatory framework are fixed and managed
before reporting the situation to the internatio-
nal community.
• The preparation of the review report - if prepa-
red in co-operation with national regulators,
the nuclear industry and licensees, and the
technical support organisations - contributes to
the establishment of a common national under-
standing on prioritising the important safety
issues.
• The reports, as such, form a comprehensive
database of nuclear programmes not only in
the own country but also in the sense of provi-
ding information on other countries’ frame-
works and programmes. Many Contracting
Parties have made their reports available
through the Internet, but also others could be
encouraged to do the same. In this also the
IAEA could provide assistance as needed.
• The publication of reports provides for transpa-
rency, which is in today’s world one of the basic
requirements for gaining general acceptability
for using nuclear power. Furthermore, the
openness in reporting can be considered to be
one expression of a well-developed safety cultu-
re.
• Confidentiality of discussions during the re-
view meetings is essential for providing an
effective and direct atmosphere for the experts
to change views on the prioritisation of safety
issues and regulatory policies. Also the way of
public reporting of the results of review mee-
tings without making comparisons between
contracting parties and without pointing out
any countries together with some country-spe-
cific needs to enhance the safety level of their
nuclear facilities is a necessity for an effective
review process.
In the Introduction, the recommendations of the
First Review Meeting to Finland are listed. These
items are discussed in this report. In addition,
taking into account the discussions and observa-
tions in the First Review Meeting, the following
list of items requiring further actions was pre-
pared. The list was also published on the Internet
after the First Review Meeting.
• Reassessment of the requirements for modifi-
cations planned by the power company and
their independent verification (see Article 14).
• Reassessment of the procedures and require-
ments for the submission of documents to aut-
horities for approval and information (see Ar-
ticle 7).
• Assessment of the degree of detail and control
of the regulatory guides and other regulations
(see Annex I).
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• Incorporation of safety culture related know-
how into a uniform national programme (see
Annex IV).
• Development of the methods for evaluating the
appropriateness and functionality of the over-
sight of licensee organisations and strengthe-
ning the control and resources in this sector
(see Articles 8 and 12).
• Enhancement of the plant modification databa-
se with adequate technical data (see Article
14).
• Training to increase awareness and considera-
tion of seismic risks at the nuclear facilities
and updating of the requirements related to
the control (see Article 14).
• Development and maintenance of STUK’s Qua-
lity System and benchmarking with other re-
gulators (see Article 13)
• Evaluation of the independence of the techni-
cal support to STUK (see Article 8).
These item are also discussed in this report under
Articles 6–19 and Annexes, as indicated in brack-
ets.
As a conclusion, in Finland the First Review
Meeting was considered very fruitful and it is
believed that the second review meeting will also
follow the same lines.
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Based on the comments received during the previ-
ous Nuclear Safety Convention Review Meeting in
1999 STUK launched a two part study on the gen-
eral coverage, consistency and prescriptivity of the
Finnish nuclear regulatory guide system. The first
part was focusing on coverage and internal con-
sistency and it was carried out as a self-assess-
ment within STUK. The second part was an inde-
pendent study made by the Technical Research
Centre of Finland, which was mainly concentrat-
ing on surveying the opinions of the licensee rep-
resentatives about the prescriptivity of the regula-
tions.
The internal study was conducted in such a
way that nominated STUK senior experts com-
pared the contents of the Finnish nuclear related
regulations (five governmental decisions) and
about 70 regulatory guides with the existing IAEA
Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements
(some earlier Safety Codes were included) docu-
ments. The task was to identify gaps in the
coverage of the Finnish regulations or, gaps in the
IAEA guidance. The consistency of Finnish regu-
lations was assessed i.a. in sense of consistent
terminology and structure as well as in sense of
consistency between the various levels of regula-
tory documents’ hierarchy.
The main findings of the internal self-assess-
ment were as follows:
• The consistency of regulations was considered
good and no major structural or terminological
problems were identified. It was concluded
that since the 1990’s the consistency of the
regulatory guide system has been paid attenti-
on to. Considering the terminology used in the
regulations it was however recommended to
establish a glossary of used terms to avoid any
misunderstandings also in future.
• The IAEA guidance is in most areas more
detailed than the Finnish regulatory guides
are. This is understandable considering the
number of target groups (member states) and
the legio of different cultures. In Finnish so-
ciety many of the detailed requirements of
IAEA guidance are considered explicitly for
granted.
• Technical areas for which more detailed gui-
dance could be developed are as follows: opera-
tional safety, decommissioning, periodic safety
review, containment systems and external fac-
tors (other than earthquakes).
• The regulatory control methods and procedu-
res should be addressed more in detail in the
regulatory guides. Especially it was recommen-
ded to include more detailed and updated desc-
riptions to the regulatory guides of enforce-
ment tools and the periodic safety review pro-
cedure and periodic inspection programme of
STUK. These additions were found necessary
in order to meet the general principles of
transparency and predictability in regulatory
control.
The findings of the internal self-assessment will
be taken into account when developing the revised
strategy for rulemaking, which is scheduled to be
established before the end of 2001.
The independent assessment of the possible
prescriptivity of the Finnish regulations and
guides was carried out by VTT. In the following
the key recommendations and conclusions of the
study are presented as an excerpt. The whole
report of VTT can be accessed on STUK’s Internet
site, at http://www.stuk.fi/english/publications/.
The findings of the independent study will be
taken into account when developing the revised
strategy for rulemaking, which is scheduled to be
established before the end of 2001.
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the earlier chapters of the report this
chapter develops some recommendations for how
to further develop the YVL-guides. There are some
obvious improvements to be implemented in the
YVL-guides in a short-term perspective, but STUK
should also initiate a discussion of a more long-
term strategy for the development of the YVL-
guides. There is also a need to discuss how the
YVL-guides are written and used with the aim of
making interpretations less dependent on the in-
spectors. Safety requirements build on a combina-
tion between deterministic and probabilistic con-
siderations, but it sometimes appears to be diffi-
cult to find a proper balance between the two
principles. This has to do with an interpretation of
the residual risk and an agreement when it is
small enough. The classification of functions,
structures and equipment is an issue, which is
under discussion in various standardisation com-
mittees and here some rethinking seems to be
necessary. Finally, in a long-term perspective, there
are obvious needs for harmonised regulatory ap-
proaches. STUK may take an active role in an
international discussion of future approaches to
regulatory oversight.
6.1 Near term development of the
YVL-guides
One would have expected that the development of
the YVL-guides is guided by a clearly expressed
strategy. A tacit strategy has evidently been gov-
erning their development over the years, but it is
would be recommendable to make that strategy
more overt. Further development of the strategy
would most certainly benefit of general discussion
within the nuclear community in Finland on ends
and means of regulatory oversight.
Views on the Finnish nuclear regulatory guides
Björn Wahlström, Risto Sairanen
VTT Automation
VTT Energy
There are also a number of larger and smaller
needs for improving present guides. The far most
problematic is YVL 5.5 which in the present form
may even lead to non-optimal practices. Closely
connected is YVL 2.1 of two reasons, firstly con-
nected to efforts to reclassify present nuclear
power plants and secondly connected to the appli-
cation of the requirements of YVL 5.5. The re-
quirements of YVL 1.0 that are connected to
severe accidents seem to require modifications to
balance the probabilistic and deterministic re-
quirements in a logical way.
The possibility that a new nuclear power plant
should be licensed in Finland places a large chal-
lenge on the whole regulatory system. The YVL-
guides themselves give an eminent platform for
the licensing process, but it may be necessary to
make an assessment of the practical arrange-
ments to ensure that undue requirements on
documentation to be supplied will not introduce
unreasonable delays in the design and construc-
tion process. Ideally a licensing process should be
adapted to assess the solutions of a design and
construction process in the order they are pro-
duced.
6.2 A harmonisation of interpretations
There seems to be some problems in maintaining
a consistent interpretation of the YVL-guides.
This is something, which has to be expected with
requirements written in a natural language, and
it may even be counterproductive to try to formu-
late the requirements in a way to minimise the
room for interpretations. According to the inter-
views the problems are accentuated when new in-
spectors are taking charge of some area. The un-
derlying problem seems to be partly connected to
the maintaining a pool of knowledge at STUK and
partly connected to the decision-making processes
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applied. If younger inspectors can get advice and
support for their own judgement this problem
should be possible to combat.
Another problem is that some YVL-guides are
interpreted more stringently and others more
freely. To some extent this is natural, because
different issues have a different weight on nuclear
safety, but the same general principles should still
apply. This problem may be pre-empted with an
increased internal dialogue within STUK to trans-
fer a kind of a meta-interpretation between differ-
ent areas of regulatory oversight.
Finally, in the light of the interviews, there
seems also to be a need for a harmonisation of
interpretations between different regulatory sys-
tems. A growing globalisation and a diminishing
number of vendors makes it increasingly impor-
tant to reach a better international harmonisation
of safety requirements. Such a harmonisation can
be achieved only in a dialogue between STUK and
other regulators in the world.
6.3 Deterministic and probabilistic
requirements
The interactions between deterministic and proba-
bilistic safety requirements are one of the keys to
the high safety level reached in the nuclear indus-
try. These concepts seem difficult to integrate in
practice and people seem often to be tuned to one
or the other. Finding a correct balance between
deterministic and probabilistic safety thinking has
to do with the fundamental question of what is
safe enough. Deterministic requirements are
needed for essential nuclear safety related compo-
nents and phenomena. On the other hand, there
should be a cut-off probability, below which deter-
ministic safety requirements are not more asked
for.
The relationship between deterministic and
probabilistic criteria can be illustrated by a simple
example. Consider a certain safety function at a
nuclear power plant, which is designed according
to applicable deterministic principles and with a
certain reliability target in mind. Can the deter-
ministic criteria be relaxed if the reliability of the
system can be shown to be very high? Safety
functions are typically implemented with systems,
which for their function rely on various auxiliary
systems. What principles should then be applied
for setting deterministic and probabilistic require-
ments on such auxiliary systems? Deterministic
design principles can sometimes be used to elimi-
nate certain failure mechanisms and then it would
be fair to credit for that property in a probabilistic
analysis. Similarly if some sequence can be shown
to be very unlikely in a probabilistic sense, then a
corresponding accident analysis should be possi-
ble to restrict to a few representative cases.
This issue has also an application on the re-
quirements set for the so-called process initiating
events. What kinds of reliability requirements are
prudent and reasonable for functions and sys-
tems, which are needed to cope with certain dis-
turbances, incidents and accidents? When should
the single failure criterion be applied also for
sequences that can be considered very unlikely
and what kind of credits can be given for diversity
in functions. A resolution of these questions has to
reflect a view on residual risks. It would be
beneficial if STUK could enter a discussion on the
relationships between such deterministic and
probabilistic criteria and their interpretation in a
few selected illustrative cases.
6.4 Classification of functions, structures
and equipment
The classification system, by which functions,
structures and equipment are graded with respect
to their importance for safety, is a key to many
other issues. If the classification system and the
requirements in different classes cannot be agreed
upon, there is little prospect that present disa-
greements and confusion will disappear. In this
connection it is important to note that the concern
is not only the classification system itself, but also
how it is interpreted and how different functions,
structures and equipment actually are allocated to
different classes.
A second issue connected to the safety classifi-
cation has to do with changes introduced in YVL
2.1. The guide has been changed two times and
the nuclear power plants made serious attempts
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to comply with the new requirements. It became
soon evident that a total plant reclassification
would be counterproductive and it was agreed
that only plant modifications would be classified
according to the new system. This principle is
practical, but it also has a potential of introducing
confusion. It was a widespread opinion among the
persons interviewed that the work connected to a
reclassification actually has created considerable
costs without any significant influence on safety.
Experience from incidents as well as PSA re-
sults demonstrate that the conventional systems
can have an important influence on safety. Classi-
fication practices of today do not typically recog-
nise this fact. If the principles for the classifica-
tion of functions, structures and equipment are
reconsidered there might be an opportunity to
reconsider also principles for handling presently
non-classified systems such as for instance the
ultimate heat sink.
YVL 5.5 would also warrant some rethinking
on how to carry out the classification. There have
been international standardisation efforts aimed
at a better approach for classification of instru-
mentation and control functions and systems im-
portant to safety. It is too early to predict in which
directions these efforts will lead, but it is clear
that STUK should involve itself in the discus-
sions.
6.5 Challenges for the future
Any system of requirements should be updated to
reflect the technical development. A reasonable re-
quirement is also that nuclear power plants built
today should be better than those built twenty
years ago. The way such a general feeling for the
need of improved solutions should be converted
into safety regulation is a different matter. In this
connection there may be a need for opening up a
societal discussion on the risks of nuclear power
as compared to risks of other sources for primary
energy. STUK should probably not be too much
involved in such a discussion, but an emerging
debate may place a need on STUK to explain the
content and the assumptions of nuclear regulation
in a language, which can be understood by educat-
ed laymen.
Another question is how regulatory oversight
will change in the future. STUK has had an
outspoken policy to move away from inspecting
technical details to inspect and review work proc-
esses of the licensees. According to the interviews
such a development would be welcome, but signs
of such a change have been small so far. Instead
many of the interviewed expressed the opinion
that the regulatory oversight had been moving
further into details.
STUK has selected not to be directly involved
in matters concerned with economics. Experience
from nuclear power plants in the world demon-
strate however, that safety can be achieved only
when the economic situation of a nuclear power
plant is sound. This observation may have some
influence on future regulatory approaches.
One issue to be considered is how modern
information technology can be utilised efficiently.
It is evident that the technology has many poten-
tials, which will require considerable investments
before they are fully realised. Experience from
information technology projects call however for
realism in the expectations. STUK has in this
connection taken a small, but welcome step for-
ward in making the regulatory system easier to
access in a new computer based system.
A final question towards the future has to do
with how the technical development will continue.
The conventional industry has already in many
fields surpassed the nuclear industry in its quality
requirements. Will this influence the nuclear reg-
ulatory systems and if so in what way? The
nuclear industry itself is considered too small by
the large international vendors to motivate the
development of specialised nuclear products. This
may lead to a situation where special nuclear
grade equipment can not be bought at any price,
or the equipment available is inferior as compared
with normal industrial grade. It seems however
likely that a requirement that the technology used
should be proven will stay, but such a requirement
should not be allowed to stop a search for better
solutions. Again it is important that STUK takes
an active role in a discussion of future directions
in the development of regulatory oversight.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter gives the general conclusions of the
study. The main conclusion must be that the YVL-
guides have to be considered as a large asset for
the Finnish nuclear community. The guides in
general can not be considered too prescriptive.
There are however a number of improvements
which could be made in the structure of the YVL-
guides, in the content of specific YVL-guides, in the
way they are interpreted and in the processes for
keeping them up to date.
In a general evaluation of the YVL-guides one can
conclude that they fulfil earlier described criteria
reasonably well. They have a structure, which is
logical and covering. They are relatively well bal-
anced with a reasonable level of detail. The re-
quirements put forward in the YVL-guides are
reasonable and they are reflecting international
practice. The guides are understandable and fair-
ly straightforward to interpret. STUK is putting
in a considerable effort to keep the guides up to
date.
The main question asked in the assignment
was whether or not the YVL-guides could be
considered too prescriptive and binding for the
nuclear utilities in Finland. Based on the inter-
views and a general assessment, this question has
to be answered with a definitive no. All persons
interviewed had a clear positive view of the YVL-
guides and they were seen as giving structure to
the safety activities at the plant. This positive
view has however to be qualified with respect to a
few problematic YVL-guides. These guides have
been treated more in detail in the earlier chapters
of the report.
The YVL-guides can be considered as an asset
of the Finnish nuclear regulatory system. It is
clear that STUK should continue the work they do
in keeping the YVL-guides up to date. The strate-
gy for further development of the guides should
however be reconsidered, discussed and docu-
mented on a continuing basis. The possibility that
a new nuclear power plant will be built in Finland
gives a number of new challenges to STUK which
have to be reflected.
In a long-term perspective, the position of the
YVL-guides as a component of the regulatory
oversight in Finland may change. The extent to
which there will be an international harmonisa-
tion of regulatory guidelines remains to be seen. It
is however evident that the nuclear community all
over the world would benefit from more harmo-
nised approaches to safety. With the present expe-
rience and skills STUK could most certainly play
an important role in this development.
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1 General
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, two 510 MWe (gross)
VVER-440 units, is owned and operated by For-
tum Power and Heat Oy (former Imatran Voima
Oy). The company name was changed in 1999 af-
ter the merging of Imatran Voima Oy and the
petrochemical company Neste Oy into Fortum
Corporation.
In 1999 the gross production of Loviisa 1 was
4066 GWh and the capacity factor was 91.0%
(gross). The annual refuelling and maintenance
outage lasted 19 days. The gross production of
Loviisa 2 was 4165 GWh, the capacity factor
93.2% and the length of the refuelling outage was
also 19 days. The annual collective radiation doses
were 0.80 manSv and 0.56 manSv for Loviisa 1
and Loviisa 2 respectively.
In the year 2000 Loviisa 1 produced 3798 GWh
(gross), the capacity factor was 84.8% and the
refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 44 days.
Loviisa 1 had an inspection outage, which is
performed every fourth year. In 2000 the gross
production of Loviisa 2 was 4075 GWh, the capaci-
ty factor was 91.0%, and the refuelling outage
lasted 19 days. The collective radiation doses in
2000 were 1.73 manSv for Loviisa 1 and 0.54
manSv for Loviisa 2.
Eight events in 1999 and seven events in 2000
were classified on the International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES). In both years there was one level 1
event and the classification of the other events
was 0. The first level 1 event was revealed in a
periodic test during the refuelling outage of Lovii-
sa 2. It was noticed that the identification tags of
two manually operated valves in the nitrogen
blowing (cleaning) lines of the emergency cooling
system sump strainers, had been interchanged. In
these two-redundant sump systems, the cleaning
operations of the strainers, if needed, would in
this case have affected the wrong redundancy. The
other level 1 event occurred at Loviisa 1 during
the refuelling outage in 2000 when recurrent line-
up errors (in filling the suction line of the draining
pump in the fuel pond cooling system) caused
reactor pool water leakages onto the floor of the
steam generator compartment.
In the first four months of 2001 three events
have been classified on the INES scale. These
events have been below the INES scale (level 0).
The first stage of the final repository for medi-
um and low level radioactive waste was licensed
in 1999. The first stage includes underground
tunnels for solid low active waste. In 2001 STUK
approved the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
of the solidification plant and detailed planning of
the plant is going on. The civil construction works
will be started later in 2001.
The interim storage for spent fuel had to be
extended when the returning of spent fuel to
Russia was terminated in 1996. The extension
part of the storage was completed in 2000.
In 1998 Fortum Power and Heat Oy launched
the environmental impact assessment procedure
(EIA) of the new nuclear power plant. The planned
location is the site of Loviisa 1 and 2. The EIA
report was finalised in 1999 and the co-ordination
authority, Ministry of Trade and Industry, gave its
statement on the procedure in 2000.
2 Modernisation and power
upgrading of Loviisa NPP
Introduction
The project for the modernisation and power up-
grading of Loviisa NPPs gave an excellent possi-
bility to take advantage of the latest development
in the nuclear power plant technology. The key
aspects were to verify the plant safety, to improve
production capacity and to give a good basis for
the extension of the plant’s lifetime to at least 45
years.
Feasibility study and project objectives
In the first phase, before starting the project, a
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor ther-
mal power was carried out. The main result was
in short that no technical or licensing issues could
be found which would prevent the raising of the
reactor thermal output up to 1500 MW from the
original level of 1375 MW.
The carefully prepared feasibility study gave a
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good picture of the necessary plant modifications
as well as essential areas in the analysis work,
which was of use in planning the critical works
and the time schedule of the project. The feasibili-
ty study focused on the following tasks:
• the optimisation of the power level and defini-
tion of the new parameters of the main process
• reactor core and fuel studies, including RPV
irradiation embrittlement
• safety analyses and licensing
• the main components and systems
• project planning and risk assessment.
The main objectives for the project were based on
the feasibility study:
(1) Plant safety level as a whole will be checked
and, if needed, improvements will be made.
(2) Plant units will be licensed for 1500 MW
reactor thermal output.
(3) Gross electric output of the plant units will be
raised to about 500 MW.
(4) Assistance to the life time extension of the
plant units.
(5) The long-term availability of the plant is not
impaired.
(6) Increase in the expert knowledge of staff.
Time schedule and project organisation
The feasibility study concerning the reactor power
upgrading and improvements of the turbine efficien-
cy was started in spring 1994. After good results
from the study, the preparation of the project plan
began in summer 1995. Critical works in the time
schedule, such as the revision of the Final Safety
Analysis Report and the preparation of certain
plant modifications, were started immediately.
The first step of the trial run by 103% reactor
power could be started in January 1997. Test runs
continued step by step during the year, and the
last transient test by final reactor power was
completed successfully in December 1997.
The Council of State awarded a new operating
license for Loviisa NPP in April 1998. The license
is valid until the end of 2007 for 1500 MW reactor
thermal power, which is 9.1% more than the
previous power level of 1375 MW. Measures to
improve the efficiency of the steam turbines will
continue in the annual maintenance outages until
the year 2002.
The implementation of the project was carried
out in co-operation between Loviisa NPP and
Fortum Engineering. In addition, many other or-
ganisations such as the Technical Research Cen-
tre of Finland (VTT) participated in the work.
Special attention was paid to the QA routines in
the project as well as to the co-ordination of the
work in several organisations. One example of
this was the particular subject-specific specialist
groups which were established to overview essen-
tial sections such as nuclear safety and commis-
sioning.
The work was divided into the following ten
sub-projects each having a responsible person
from the organisations of both Loviisa NPP and
Fortum Engineering:
(1) Operating licenses
(2) Other licenses
(3) Safety analyses and basic data management
(4) FSAR revision and comparison of the plant
with regulatory body guidelines
(5) PSA (including level 2 PSA)
(6) Modification of the turbines
(7) Electricity systems
(8) Reactor and fuel
(9) Process systems and automation
(10)Commissioning and revision of instructions.
Technical implementation and experience of
the trial operation
Increasing the electrical output by about 50 MW
at each unit was part of the Loviisa modernisation
programme. After completing the upgrading of the
reactor thermal output in April 1998, more than
80% of the total increase in the electrical output
was fulfilled. The rest of the power increase is
available when the measures to improve the steam
turbines are completed in the year 2002.
The reactor power upgrading from 1375 MW to
1500 MW was planned on the basis of optimising
the need for heavy plant modifications. In the
primary side and the sea water cooling system,
the mass flow rates were not affected, but the
temperature difference has been increased in pro-
portion to the power upgrading. In the turbine
side, the live steam and the feedwater flow rate
were increased by about 10%; the live steam
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pressure was not changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum
fuel linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase
in the reactor thermal output was carried out by
optimising the power distribution in the core and
the power of any single fuel bundle was not
increased above the maximum level before power
upgrading. In parallel with this work, more ad-
vanced options related to the mixing rate of the
cooling water in the fuel subchannels and the
increasing of fuel enrichment were investigated.
The dummy elements installed on the periphery
of the core in Loviisa 1 and 2 were preserved to
minimise irradiation embrittlement of the reactor
pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary
side are rather large and the hardware modifica-
tions needed there were quite limited. Replace-
ment of the pressuriser safety valves was indicat-
ed already during the feasibility study as a neces-
sary measure because of the power upgrading.
Most of the other substantial measures in the
primary side were carried out on the basis of the
continuing effort to maintain and raise the safety
level of the plant, and they were not directly
included in the power upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive
measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical
components. Steam turbines were modified to a
higher steam flow rate. Because of these meas-
ures, also the efficiency and operation reliability
has improved. Certain modifications were carried
out in the electrical generators and the main
transformers to ensure reliability in continuous
operation with the upgraded power output.
The last step in the process to upgrade the
reactor thermal power was the long-term trial run
to verify the main process parameters as well as
plant operation in both steady state and transient
situations. The trial run was carried out at gradu-
ally upgraded reactor power with a power level of
103%, 105%, 107% and finally 109%. Transient
tests defined in the test programme were per-
formed with a reactor thermal power of 105% and
109%. The test results correspond very well with
all analyses and calculations. All the acceptance
criteria for the tests were fulfilled.
Licensing procedure and safety analyses
The modernisation programme as a whole was
started from the basis of the positive safety
progress. This was applied by taking advantage of
the latest development in calculation codes and
technology as well as feedback of the operating
experience, expertise in the ageing processes and
safety reassessment coupled with the evolution of
safety standards.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of
the project, from the early planning of the concept
to the evaluation of the results from the test runs.
STUK examined all the modification plans that
might be expected to have an impact on plant
safety. Individual permits were granted stage by
stage, based on the successful implementation of
previous work.
The renewal of the operating license for the
increased reactor power was carried out in the
following steps:
• permission from the Ministry of Trade and
Industry to make plant modifications and test
runs with upgraded reactor power under the
existing operating license and under the cont-
rol of STUK
• assessment of the environmental impact (EIA-
procedure) of the project
• STUK’s approval of the Final Safety Analyses
Report (FSAR), the safety-related plant modifi-
cations, test programmes and results.
• the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the respon-
sible authority for the NPP operating licenses,
received a statement from several local and
national organisations
• the operating license was prepared by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Coun-
cil of State awarded the license in their session
on 2 April 1998. The license is awarded to 1500
MW nominal reactor thermal power until the
end of the year 2007.
The environmental impact has been assessed in
the EIA Report, which was completed in Decem-
ber 1996. This was the first time in Finland (par-
allel with TVO plant having a corresponding mod-
ernisation programme) the EIA Procedure has
been applied to a nuclear power plant. The law
and the decree set certain procedures, including a
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public hearing for screening, scoping and the EIA
statement, which are the stages of this procedure.
The result was that the reactor thermal power
upgrading has no other considerable environmen-
tal impact than a slight increase in the outlet
temperature of the cooling water. This means that
the maximum temperature increase of the cooling
water in the main condenser, before released back
to the sea, is about 1°C higher than the previous
temperature increase, which was typically close to
10°C.
An extensive safety review and comparison of
the plant with the latest national regulatory body
guidelines (YVL guides) have been carried out.
This work was performed taking into account
many international standards, such as the IAEA
standard “A Common Basis for Judging the Safety
of Nuclear Power Plants Built to the Earlier
Standards INSAG-8”. As a result of the work, a
particular safety review report has been complet-
ed.
A part of the safety review and the licensing
process of the reactor power upgrading was the
renewal of the Final Safety Analysis Report. New
accident analyses have been made concerning the
containment pressure, LOCA and MSLB, for ex-
ample. In addition to the accident analyses, there
is a large number of transient situations that have
also been analysed. The risk for a radioactive
release to the environment was probabilistically
considered (PSA level 2) for the first time for
Loviisa NPP.
3 Severe Accident
Management
implementation at
Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident program, which in-
cludes plant modifications and severe accident
management procedures, was initiated in order to
meet the requirements of the Finnish regulatory
authority, STUK.
Fortum’s approach for severe accident assess-
ment and management for Loviisa is based on
four successive levels. The first level of the ap-
proach is to ensure that severe accidents can be
prevented with high probability. The quantitative
targets for the overall core damage frequency
(CDF) obtained from PSA level 1, are 10-4 /reactor
year for existing plants.
The second level is to show a very low fraction
of overall CDF for those classes of accident se-
quences which can be assumed to directly lead to
a large release. Such sequences are the ones with
an impaired containment system function, high
pressure core melt sequences and reactivity acci-
dents leading to core damage. The class called
sequences with impaired containment function
consists of containment by-pass sequences (espe-
cially, primary to secondary leakage accidents),
sequences with pre-existing openings, contain-
ment isolation failures, containment pressure sup-
pression system by-passes and sequences with
induced leakage outside the containment.
On the third level of the approach, the focus is
on physical phenomena capable of threatening the
containment integrity. The challenge to the con-
tainment integrity due to any physical phenome-
na should be excluded either by excluding the
phenomenon itself as physically unreasonable or
by showing that the loads caused by the phenome-
non are tolerable. The phenomena considered in-
clude in-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosions,
hydrogen burns, direct containment heating, mis-
siles, slow overpressurization due to steaming and
generation of noncondensable gases, core-concrete
interaction, recriticality of the degraded core and
core debris, and temperature loadings of the con-
tainment. It is obvious that plant specific studies
are needed for proper treatment of the individual
phenomena. Instead of traditional PSA level 2
type of approach, in case of Loviisa, Fortum has
treated the main phenomenological, Loviisa-spe-
cific questions along the lines of the ROAAM (Risk
Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology) ap-
proach.
After successful exclusion of the containment
system and structural failures, the fourth and
final level of the approach is to define the radioac-
tive releases through containment leakages. The
releases during the managed accident sequences
should stay below the acceptable criteria concern-
ing acute health effects and land contamination.
For Loviisa, the approach translates to ensur-
ing the following top level safety functions:
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• depressurization of the primary circuit
• absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen
burns
• coolability and retention of molten core in the
reactor vessel
• long term containment cooling
• ensuring subcriticality
• ensuring containment isolation.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy proposed for
Loviisa is the coolability of corium inside the reac-
tor pressure vessel (RPV) through external cool-
ing of the vessel. Since the RPV is not penetrated,
all the ex-vessel phenomena such as ex-vessel
steam explosions, direct containment heating and
core-concrete interactions can be excluded. The
only energetic phenomena remaining which could
have potential to threaten the containment integ-
rity are hydrogen burns.
In-vessel retention of corium
Some of the design features of the Loviisa Plant
make it most amenable for using the concept in-
vessel retention (IVR) of corium by external cool-
ing of the RPV as the principle means of arresting
the progress of a core melt accident. Such features
include
• the low power density of the core
• large water volumes both in the primary and in
the secondary side
• no penetrations in the lower head of the RPV
and, finally,
• ice condensers ensure a flooded cavity in most
severe accident scenarios.
On the other hand, if in-vessel retention was not
attempted, showing resistance to energetic steam
generation and coolability of corium in the reactor
cavity could be laborious for Loviisa, because of
the small, water filled cavity with small floor area
and tight venting paths for the steam out of the
cavity.
The main focus of the thermal studies for IVR
is therefore on finding out 1) the actual heat flux
from the molten corium pool and 2) the critical
heat fluxes at the corresponding locations on the
RPV wall. Because of the relatively thick RPV
wall, and because of the crust, which creates
isothermal boundary conditions for the molten
pool, the in-vessel and ex-vessel heat transfer
phenomena can be effectively decoupled from each
other.
An extensive research program was carried out
by Fortum. The work included both experimental
and analytical studies on heat transfer in a mol-
ten pool with volumetric heat generation and on
heat transfer and flow behaviour at the RPV outer
surface.
Based on experiments, the IVR concept for
Loviisa was finalised in April 1994. The concept
includes plant modifications at four locations. The
most laborious one is the modification of the lower
neutron and thermal shield such that it can be
lowered down in case of an accident to allow free
passage of water in contact with the RPV bottom.
Other two modifications include slight changes of
thermal insulations and ventilation channels in
order to ensure effective natural circulation of
water in the channel surrounding the RPV. Final-
ly a strainer facility will be constructed in the
reactor cavity in order to screen out possible
impurities from the coolant flow and thereby pre-
vent clogging of the narrow flow paths around the
RPV.
The conceptual design was submitted to STUK
for approval and approval in principle was re-
ceived in December 1995.
Absence of energetic events
Based on plant-specific features, the only real con-
cern regarding potential energetic phenomena is
due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa
reactors are equipped with ice-conderser contain-
ments, which are relatively large in size (compa-
rable to the volume of typical large dry contain-
ments) but have a low design pressure of 0.17
MPa. The ultimate failure pressure has been esti-
mated to be well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate
deck divides the containment in the upper (UC)
and lower compartments (LC). All the nuclear
steam supply system (NSSS) components are lo-
cated in the lower compartment and, therefore,
any release of hydrogen will be directed into the
lower compartment. In order to reach the upper
compartment, which is significantly larger in vol-
ume, the hydrogen and steam have to pass
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through the ice-condensers.
Because of the relatively low design pressure of
the containment, the hydrogen burns that can
create a potential threat include not only detona-
tions, but also all large-scale combustion events
that are rapid enough to yield an essentially
adiabatic behaviour. An additional concern, which
is caused by the type of the containment, occurs
when the steam and hydrogen mixture passes
through the ice-condenser. The steam will be con-
densed in the ice beds, which could potentially
lead to very high local hydrogen concentrations.
In the early 1990’s an extensive research pro-
gram was initiated at Fortum to assess the relia-
bility and adequacy of the existing igniter system.
One of the focus areas in the studies was to
determine the prerequisites for creating and
maintaining a global convective flow loop around
the containment for ensuring well mixed condi-
tions. The global flow loop which passes from the
lower compartment through an ice-condenser to
the upper compartment and back to the LC
through the other ice-condenser is necessary in
order to bring air into the LC and thus to be able
to recombine or burn hydrogen in a controlled way
already in the LC. The experiments and the relat-
ed numerical calculations demonstrated that the
global convective loop will be created and main-
tained reliably provided that the ice-condenser
doors will stay open.
The studies have been completed and the new
hydrogen management strategy for Loviisa has
been formulated. The new hydrogen management
scheme concentrates on two functions: ensuring
air recirculation flow paths to establish a well-
mixed atmosphere (opening of ice condenser
doors) and effective recombination and/or control-
led ignition of hydrogen. Plant modifications
which are necessary include the new hydrogen
recombination devices and a dedicated system for
opening the ice-condenser doors.
Prevention of long term overpressurization
The studies on prevention of long term overpres-
surization at Loviisa started by considering the
concept of filtered venting, as was done for many
European NPPs after the Chernobyl accident.
However, the capability of the steel shell contain-
ment to resist subatmospheric pressures is poor. If
using filtered venting, it is possible that the
amount of noncondensable gases after the venting
is significantly less than originally, which later—
after cooldown of the containment atmosphere—
may lead to subatmospheric pressures and possi-
bly collapse of the containment. Therefore, alter-
native solutions were sought for.
Since the concrete used in the reactor cavity of
Loviisa does not contain any CO2, the amount of
noncondensable gases (except for hydrogen) gen-
erated during core-concrete interaction would be
practically zero. Therefore, the overpressure pro-
tection of the containment could be limited to
condensing the steam produced. An obvious way
of doing this is to spray the exterior of the contain-
ment steel shell. Later on, the concept of in-vessel
retention was introduced to Loviisa (as discussed
above), which excludes core-concrete interactions
altogether and thus finally ensures that no non-
condensable gases apart from hydrogen need to be
considered.
The system is designed to remove the heat
from the containment in a severe accident when
other means of decay heat removal from the
containment are not operable. Due to the ice
condenser containment, the time delay from the
onset of the accident to the start of the external
spray system is long (18–36 hours). Thus the
required heat removal capacity is also low, only
3 MW (fraction of decay power is still absorbed by
thick concrete walls). The system is started manu-
ally when the containment pressure reaches the
design pressure 1.7 bar. Autonomous operation of
the system independently from plant emergency
diesels is ensured with dedicated local diesel gen-
erators. The single failure criterion is applied. The
active parts of the system are independent from
all other containment decay heat removal sys-
tems. There are no active parts of the system
inside the containment.
The both units Loviisa 1 and 2 have their own
external spraying circuits and spray water storage
tanks. The cooling circuit of the spraying system
and the dedicated diesel generators are common
for both units. The ultimate heat sink is sea water.
The design calculations were carried out with
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Fortum’s own simplified containment thermal-
hydraulic code PREDEC. The PREDEC calcula-
tions were supported by experiments carried out
at the HDR containment (tests E11.2 and E11.4)
in Germany. These experiments were aimed at
studying the hydrogen distribution during strati-
fied conditions inside the containment. The main
result from the HDR experiments was that the
PREDEC code could be used for the design calcu-
lations of the external spray system.
The influence of the external spray system was
further studied experimentally using the VICTO-
RIA facility.
Primary circuit depressurization
The primary depressurization is an interface ac-
tion between the preventive and mitigative parts
of SAM. If the primary feed function is operable,
the depressurization may prevent the core melt. If
not, it sets in motion the mitigative actions and
measures to protect the containment integrity and
mitigate large releases.
Manual depressurization capability has been
designed and implemented through motor-operat-
ed relief valves. Depressurization capacity will be
sufficient for bleed&feed operation with high-pres-
sure pumps, and for reducing the primary pres-
sure before the molten corium degrades the reac-
tor vessel strength. Depressurization is to be
initiated from indications of superheated temper-
atures at core exit thermocouples. The depressuri-
zation valves were installed at the same time with
the replacement of the existing pressurizer safety
valves in 1996.
Implementation
The SAM-strategy described in the previous chap-
ters has lead to a number of hardware changes at
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The containment external spray was imple-
mented at the two units in 1990 and 1991. Prima-
ry system depressurization capability was in-
stalled at both units in 1996. The major backfit-
tings related to external coolability of the reactor
pressure vessel and to opening the ice-condenser
doors are, for the most part, implemented at
Loviisa 1 in 2000 and at Loviisa 2 in 2002. Test
samples of the new hydrogen recombination devic-
es have been aged and tested in plant conditions
and the devices will be installed in 2002. In
addition to the mechanical equipment, the imple-
mentation includes also a new, dedicated, limited
scope instrumentation and control system for the
SAM-systems, a dedicated AC-power system and a
separate SAM control room which is common to
both units.
The severe accidents guidance for the operat-
ing crew consists of SAM-procedures for the oper-
ators and of a so-called Severe Accident Handbook
for the Technical Support Team. The SAM proce-
dures are entered after a prolonged uncovery of
the reactor core indicated by highly superheated
core exit temperatures. The procedures are symp-
tom oriented and their main objective is the pro-
tection of containment integrity through ensuring
the top level severe accident safety functions. The
most important operator actions after the core
uncovery are the ensuring of containment isola-
tion, primary circuit depressurization, opening of
ice-condenser doors in order to ensure mixing of
hydrogen, lowering of the neutron shield of the
lower part of the RPV and, in the long term,
starting of the containment external spray. The
Severe Accident Handbook contains background
material for the procedures and it should facilitate
the support team in gaining understanding of the
progress of the accident and of potential means of
recovery.
4 Qualification system for
non-destructive testing
See Annex III, Development of the safety of the
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and Chapter 4. The
text in Annex III applies also for Loviisa nuclear
power plant. The only difference is that the situa-
tion of Fortum’s inspection qualifications (last par-
agraph) is that the qualification of in-service in-
spections based on ENIQ recommendations was
started in 1998.
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5 Exchange of operation
experience with similar
power plants
VVER reactor operating experience is collected,
screened and evaluated by a dedicated operating
experience feedback group composed of engineers
from the plant operation organisation and from
Fortum Nuclear Services. The group can give rec-
ommendations on further studies and measures to
the operating organisation. The main information
to be handled comes from WANO Moscow Centre
which links all the VVER reactor operators. Addi-
tional reports are received from the IAEA, OECD/
NEA and NRC, and naturally the activities of the
operation experience feedback group are not limit-
ed only to VVER reactors.
The plant managers of VVER-440 reactors run
a so-called VVER Club with periodic meetings.
The plant operation problems, modernisation,
back-fitting, lifetime extension and safety ques-
tions are handled and experiences are exchanged
in these meetings and in further individual con-
tacts.
Loviisa Power Plant participates in the WANO
Peer Review Programme by sending peers to oth-
er plants including VVER plants. In February -
March 2001 WANO Moscow Centre organised a
Peer Review at Loviisa Power Plant. Several peers
including the team leader came from other VVER
plants. This co-operation between plants of the
same design serve also the exchange of relevant
operation experiences.
Fortum Nuclear Services has been a partner in
several international and Finnish safety and qual-
ity related support programmes. Loviisa Power
Plant has participated in some of these projects
and has had a possibility to widen the organisa-
tion’s experience on current development with
other VVER operators. The same applies to a
couple of direct commercial consultation projects
which have been managed by Loviisa Power Plant.
In the area of radiation protection, Loviisa
Power Plant is participating in the IAEA Techni-
cal Co-operation Project RER/9/063 “Enhancing
Occupational Radiation Protection in Nuclear
Power Plants”. The workshops organised by the
project bring together VVER and RBMK health
physicists to exchange information on current
issues in radiation protection.
6 Modification management
development
An analysis of reported events often reveals that
deficiencies of modification management have
been a contributing factor. Such deficiencies in-
clude late planning, lack of co-ordination with oth-
er works, last moment changes, documentation de-
fects, unfinished disassembling works and delayed
updating of the documentation.
Proper planning and scheduling are the key
factors in modification management. Loviisa Pow-
er Plant has completed an extensive project train-
ing course in 2000 for those in the operating
organisation who will be involved in future modifi-
cation projects. Successful projects such as the
plant modernisation and power upgrading have
been used as good examples.
The scheduling of the modification planning for
the next outage is fixed in order to get enough
time for preparations. Minor modifications are
concentrated to every second annual maintenance
outage and major works are carried out every
fourth year. This is accomplished by starting from
a long term investment planning which converts
into a long term modification plan.
During the maintenance outage the scheduling
office is directing their efforts from the previous
control of the overall schedule to controlling the
individual work packages including also the modi-
fication works. In the main schedule more time is
allocated to tests related to start-up. New ar-
rangements for handling the work orders in the
main control room have been introduced for the
next annual outages. The idea is to even up the
work load in the main control room and decrease
the disturbance of the operators.
Quality procedures for executing modifications
have recently been updated. The authority to
make decisions on last moment changes in the
scope or schedule of the modification works has
been clarified.
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7 Development of the quality
system
After Fortum Corporation was formed a need for
an updated quality policy was obvious. In 1999 a
quality statement “Fortum’s Policy Commitment
to Quality in the Nuclear Power Operations” was
issued by the president of Fortum Power and Heat
Oy. The statement has been confirmed in 2001
also by the new management of Fortum Power
and Heat Oy.
The recent development of the plant quality
management system is based on the principle of
continuous improvement in accordance with the
observations and remarks made in quality audits
and quality assessments.
Loviisa Power Plant adopted in 2001 a newly
formulated management procedure which defines
an annual planning process from strategic plan-
ning to annual reports. A first 10-year strategic
plan for the power plant was developed in 2000.
A second important and new procedure de-
scribes those review processes (e.g. management
reviews, self assessments), which are needed in
an effective quality management system.
In the internal quality audits, new efforts are
directed to the evaluation of the recurrence of
events. These have considerably increased the
necessary background work both in the prepara-
tion and in the reporting phase of an internal
audit.
An evaluation of the plant quality management
system against the ISO/DIS 9001, 9004:2000
standards was made in 2000 by Fortum Engineer-
ing. The work continues in 2001 and a similar
comparison with IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-
Q has already been ordered.
Preparation of the environmental management
system according to the ISO 14001 standard is
included in the quality management system. Prep-
arations at the procedure level have introduced a
new chapter in the Quality Manual and in the
updating of numerous quality procedures. A novel
environmental aspect shall be considered in inter-
nal audits and new part-time auditors have been
trained for environmental evaluations. The readi-
ness for certification of the environmental man-
agement system should be achieved by the end of
2001.
The present tracking system for quality and
safety decisions, obligations and actions has ca-
pacity limitations and a new tailored application
will be delivered in 2001.
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1 General
Production
Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) owns two 840 MWe
boiling water reactors Olkiluoto 1 (OL1) and
Olkiluoto 2 (OL2) located in Olkiluoto.
In 1999 net production at OL1 was 7112 GWh
and the capacity factor 96.9%. The annual outage
and refuelling of OL1 was performed in May and
lasted 8 days. The net production of OL2 was
7091 GWh and the capacity factor was 96.6%. The
annual outage and refuelling of OL2 was in May
and lasted 10 days. The total number of manhours
of the outages was 147000. At peak, there were
671 outside workers.
In 2000 net production at OL1 was 7043 GWh
and the capacity factor was 95.7%. The annual
outage and refuelling of OL1 was performed in
May–June and lasted 14 days. The net production
of OL2 was 7091 GWh and the capacity factor was
95.5%. The annual outage and refuelling of OL2
was in May and lasted 14 days. The total number
of manhours of the outages was 253000. At peak,
there were 870 outside workers. Inspections made
during the annual outages showed that the plant
units are in good condition and that any faults or
defects were minimal. The company policy is to
keep the plant units as good as new.
INES-classified events
During the year 1999 four events occurred that
were classified level 1 on the International Nucle-
ar Event Scale (INES). The events were:
OL1 – Erroneous installation of the valve in the
Containment Gas Treatment System,
OL1 – Defects in the torque settings of the outer
isolation valve actuators in the RHR System,
OL2 – Personnel airlock of the containment left
open against the Technical Specifications du-
ring outage maintenance work and
OL2 – Deviating vertical position of fuel elements
in the core.
All the events during the year 2000 were classi-
fied level 0 or below on the INES scale. In the first
quarter of 2001, one deviation was observed and
classified level 1. The bakelite pinions of several
valve actuators had cracks and two of them were
damaged mainly due to fatigue. Due to this obser-
vation bakelite pinions were replaced by brass pin-
ions in the outer isolation valves of the core spray
system of both units.
Environmental matters
The preparation of the environmental manage-
ment system based on the ISO 14001 standard
was started in 1998 and accomplished at the end
of 1999 when TVO was granted an international
certificate based on this environmental manage-
ment system.
The EIA-procedure, the investigation of the
environmental impacts of a third reactor unit
possibly to be built at Olkiluoto, was finalised in
February 2000, when the contact authority, the
Ministry of Trade and Industry gave its statement
on the EIA report.
Management of operating waste and spent
nuclear fuel
By the end of the year 2000, 3942 cubic meters of
low and medium level operating waste has accu-
mulated in Olkiluoto. Most of this waste has been
disposed in the VLJ-repository in Olkiluoto.
Spent nuclear fuel is stored in an interim store
at Olkiluoto. By the end of the year 2000, 853 tons
of spent uranium has accumulated at Olkiluoto.
The company’s liability for its nuclear waste
management was settled by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry at EUR 663.0 million at the end of
year 2000. The reserve in the Finnish State Nucle-
ar Waste Management Fund, as determined from
the liability, is EUR 656.2 million.
In May 1999, Posiva Oy, a company jointly
owned by TVO and Fortum Power and Heat Oy,
submitted to the Council of State an application
for a Decision in Principle for a spent fuel final
disposal plant to be constructed at Olkiluoto. In
December 2000, the Council of State gave a posi-
tive decision. The Finnish Parliament approved
the Decision in Principle for the final disposal
plant after voting in May 2001.
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Provision for a new nuclear power plant
unit
In November 2000, TVO submitted to the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry an application for a
Decision in Principle for the fifth nuclear reactor
unit to be constructed either in Olkiluoto or in
Loviisa. The application has been reviewed by all
stakeholders, and the respective statements have
been submitted to the Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry that prepares the issue for a Council of
State decision.
2 Enhanced safety and
improved production through
modernisation at
Olkiluoto NPP
Introduction
OL1 and OL2 have been in operation for over 20
years. The performance indicators have been fa-
vourable. For instance, the average capacity factor
for the last ten years is well above 90%.
Already before modernisation the plant design
was reasonably modern due to the following ad-
vanced features included in the original design:
• internal main circulation pumps
• fine motion control rod drives
• 4 × 50% redundant safety systems
• inerted pre-stressed concrete containment,
back fitted against severe accidents.
Numerous design modifications have been imple-
mented since the commissioning of the units. For
instance, the containments were back fitted
against severe accidents at the end of the 80’s.
TVO’s policy has been to keep the plant continu-
ously up-to-date.
It would be imprudent to take favourable per-
formance for granted. Therefore, TVO started pro-
actively a modernisation program in 1994. It was
recognised that there were many modifications to
be implemented in the next years and a decision
was made to include them in a program called
“modernisation”.
The operating licences of Olkiluoto 1 and
Olkiluoto 2 were renewed in 1998. The time sched-
ule of the modernisation was established so that
the outcome of the program could be utilised in
the operating licence renewal.
Principles and goals
From the beginning, the following principles were
followed in the program:
• technical development was exploited
• new safety requirements
• advanced design solutions
• operational experiences were utilised
• own experiences
• experiences from other plants
• own staff was used as much as possible
• losses in electricity production were avoided
• plant modifications presupposing shutdown
were implemented during normal refuelling
and maintenance outages
• cost/benefit approach was applied.
The main goals of the modernisation were as fol-
lows:
• reviewing safety features and enhancing safe-
ty, when feasible
• improving the production related performance,
• finding factors limiting the plant lifetime and
eliminating them, when feasible
• enhancing the expertise of the own staff and
improving productivity.
The goals supported each other. For instance, it is
easier to license the reactor uprating if safety is
simultaneously enhanced. On the other hand, the
cost of safety improvements can be compensated
for by the additional output working for lower pro-
duction cost.
Safety enhancement
In order to achieve the safety goal, the existing
plant design has been reviewed and compared to
the present and foreseeable safety requirements.
The most important requirements are included in
the YVL Guides issued by the Finnish regulatory
body (STUK) for new nuclear power plants. Com-
pliance with the European Utility Requirements
(EUR) has also been reviewed.
The need to fulfil new requirements set for the
new nuclear power plants has been considered
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case by case. The living PSA model of the plant
has been utilised within this context.
The most important safety related modifica-
tions included in the modernisation program are
listed below:
• Reactor pressure relief system has been diver-
sified by installing two additional relief valves.
• ATWS behaviour has been improved by modi-
fying some trip signals and making boron in-
jection automatic and more effective.
• Additional severe accident mitigation measu-
res have been implemented.
• Earthquake resistance of the plant has been
checked and related modifications have been
made.
• Partial scram function has been strengthened.
• Generator switching device was replaced with
a new one, which is able to switch also short
circuit current.
• Protection against frazil ice at the seawater
intake has been improved.
• Protection against snowstorms at the air inta-
ke of the emergency diesels has been improved.
The modernisation program as a whole reduced
the severe core damage frequency estimate by a
factor of seven.
The radiation exposure of the population was
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle.
Liquid releases have been reduced by a factor of
ten by improving the liquid waste handling sys-
tems. Also occupational doses have been reduced.
In practice, this means minimising the cobalt
content in the primary circuit.
Production improvement
Four ways were followed to increase the electrici-
ty production:
Reducing the unplanned capacity loss factor
There has not been many operational disturbanc-
es until now, but there will be more due to the
ageing of equipment and components. Replace-
ment of the components helps in itself. In addition
to that, favourable system solutions have been re-
alised that, tolerate more component failures
without an adverse impact on the plant operation.
For instance the original one out of two turbine
protection and control systems have been replaced
by a new two out of three system.
Shortening refuelling and maintenance outages
Olkiluoto outages have not been very long in the
past. However, there is still room for improve-
ment. For instance, the refuelling machine has
been speeded up by modernising its instrumenta-
tion.
Improving thermal efficiency
The low pressure turbines have been replaced and
in that way about 30 MWe additional production
capacity in each unit has been achieved.
Uprating the reactor thermal power
The following facts made power uprating possible:
• development of the BWR technology
• margins revealed by operational experience
• plant modifications due to other reasons.
The most important development in this respect
has taken place in fuel technology. The operation
was started with 8×8 bundles and now 10×10 bun-
dles are used. The new bundles are able to pro-
duce 40 percent more power than the old ones.
The reactor uprating is a sensitive matter that
must be treated with extreme care. The following
criteria have been applied:
• safety level after the modernisation program at
least the same as before
• no adverse effect on long-term availability,
• no shortening of plant life-time
• additional electricity production economically
justified.
The thermal power was uprated from 2160 MW to
2500 MW (15.7 percent). Some design changes im-
plemented due to the uprating are listed below:
• 10×10 fuel bundles are used instead of the
original 8×8 bundles.
• Inertia of the main circulation pumps has been
increased electrically.
• Steam separators have been replaced.
• High-pressure turbine was modified.
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• High-pressure turbine valves were replaced.
• Feed water system has been modified.
• Capacity of the decay heat removal system has
been increased.
• Generator has been replaced.
• Main transformers have been replaced.
Enhancing staff expertise
The modernisation program continues TVO’s poli-
cy to maintain and enhance the expertise of the
own staff by having challenging projects always in
progress. The most important projects since the
plant commissioning have been the previous reac-
tor uprating, severe accident mitigation, training
simulator, PSA, interim storage for spent fuel, fi-
nal repository for reactor waste, investigation pro-
gram for disposal of spent fuel, preparation of the
specifications and evaluation of the bids for a new
nuclear power plant in the beginning of the 1990’s
and again in the beginning of the 2000’s. All the
drive and expertise focusing on a new plant has
been directed to the existing plant units.
Implementation
The modernisation program consisted of about 40
separate projects. The installations were per-
formed during the refuelling outages of the years
1996–1998. In spite of large modifications the re-
fuelling outage times were reasonable, between 15
and 20 days. The test program was quite the same
as in the case of a new plant. In addition, the
capacity factors of the power plant units have been
satisfactory (well above 90%) during and after the
modernisation
The total cost of the modernisation program
was FIM 800 million.
Licensing
Licensing steps related to the modernisation pro-
gram were as follows:
• An uprated Safety Analysis Report (PSAR, for
example) and an uprated Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (level 1 PSA) have been submitted
to and reviewed by STUK.
• Design modifications and test runs were ac-
cepted by STUK before implementation.
• The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and
the related Topical Reports were rewritten. It
means also that almost all transient and acci-
dent analyses were redone taking into account
the uprated power level and modified plant
design. The FSAR and Topical Reports have
been submitted to STUK at the end of 1996.
• An operating license renewal application, cove-
ring design modifications and the power upra-
ting, was submitted to the Council of State at
the end of 1996. The A license was granted in
1998.
• The power uprating has been reviewed also
according to the Environmental Impact Legis-
lation.
Summary
The modernisation program of the Olkiluoto plant
was started in 1994 and completed in 1998. Some
latter installations were realised during outages
in 1999. The modernisation consisted of about 40
projects. The total cost of the program was FIM
800 million. The results were
• ensured safety
• additional production capacity (over 260 MW
in total)
• extended plant life time
• more competent and motivated staff.
3 Severe Accident
Management at OL1
and OL2
The provisions for severe accident management
were installed in OL1 and OL2 during the SAM
project which was finished in 1989. The measures
implemented were
• containment overpressure protection
• containment filtered venting
• lower drywell flooding from wetwell
• containment penetration shieldings in lower
drywell
• containment water filling from external source
• containment instrumentation for severe acci-
dent control
• Emergency Operating Procedures for severe
accidents.
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Subsequent accident management activities at
Olkiluoto plant comprise both the development of
accident management procedures and additional
plant modifications. They were initiated mainly
during the OL1 and OL2 modernisation project.
Some hardware changes have been implemented,
others are planned. The necessary analyses are
often carried out in co-operation with appropriate
research institutions.
Emergency Operating Procedures for Severe
Accidents
Emergency Operating Procedures for Severe Acci-
dents have been modified in order to take into
account plant modifications and to enhance severe
accident management. The containment filtered
venting system rupture disk line from the upper
drywell will no more be closed in the beginning of
an accident. This is a precaution for a possible
rapid pressurisation of the containment if the gen-
eration of non-condensable gases is large. The pre-
viously manual depressurisation of the primary
system in severe accidents has been replaced by
an automatic actuation of the depressurisation
system.
Containment filtered venting system—
impact of chlorine in the filter
In a severe accident, a large amount of chlorine
could be released, due to irradiation and heating,
from the synthetic rubbers used as the insulation
material of the electrical cables. In order to main-
tain the iodine retention capability, the sodium
thiosulfate concentration of the filter was in-
creased in 1999. The iodine retention capability
and stability of the solution have been experimen-
tally verified by TVO and the Technical Research
Centre of Finland, VTT.
Containment pH
A large amount of chlorine, which could be con-
verted to HCl in the containment, could reduce
the pH of the water pools and wet surfaces. The
chlorine originates from the synthetic rubbers
used as insulation in cables. This could lead to a
significant amount of elemental as well as organic
iodine. Another source of organic iodine could be
reactions between boron carbide in control rods,
steam and iodine in the degrading core.
TVO has investigated the possibilities to en-
hance the retention of iodine by a containment pH
control system. The solution used would be 50%
NaOH, which is already normally used by the
water treatment plant. A new NaOH tank has
been installed. The required NaOH volume was
analysed by VTT. The required volume is about
5 m3 according to the calculations. The solution is
gravity driven into a raw water storage tank near
fire water outlet nozzles, from where the solution
is delivered into the containment during contain-
ment water filling.
The lower drywell will be flooded from the
wetwell prior to the NaOH supply and the lower
drywell water pool pH will be kept above 7. The
system modifications were made in 2001.
Organic iodide
VTT Chemical Technology investigates possibili-
ties to improve the retention of organic iodide. The
purpose is to find means to improve the existing
containment venting filters so that they are capa-
ble of trapping the organic iodine compounds and
of preventing iodine from forming organic com-
pounds. Possible means are the oxidation of ele-
mental iodine by modifying the chemical composi-
tion of the filter or by using catalytic oxidation.
The work started with a literature study followed
by experiments. The experiments will be finished
in 2001.
Energetic ex-vessel fuel coolant interactions
TVO has investigated the response of concrete
structures in the containment to energetic fuel
coolant interactions, steam explosions, and the re-
sult is that they would withstand large steam ex-
plosion loads. Further studies will deal with the
impact of possible steam explosions on the pipe
penetrations and personnel access hatch in the
lower drywell. The key issue is maintaining the
containment leaktightness in severe accidents.
TVO has decided to strengthen the lower dry-
well personnel access lock. The modifications will
be made in 2001 and 2002.
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 1 0
45
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAFETY OF THE OLKILUOTO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ANNEX III
Diaphragm floor seal
TVO investigates how the diaphragm floor seal
would behave in severe accidents. The leaktight-
ness of the seal is important in order to maintain
the pressure suppression function of the contain-
ment as long as possible.
Reliability of isolation valves
The piping part inside the lower drywell may be
damaged because of contact with core debris. In
order to ensure the isolation function in severe
accidents, an additional second isolation valve was
installed in 1998 in the nitrogen system piping
lines from the lower drywell to the reactor build-
ing.
Hydrogen combustion phenomena in reactor
building
During a severe accident, hydrogen gas leaking
from the containment might lead to combustible
hydrogen concentration in the reactor building
compartments. TVO is investigating possible hy-
drogen combustion loads in the reactor building,
including hydrogen burns and detonations. The
investigations have started with the preparation
of a CFD model of the reactor building to find out
the hydrogen transport routes and hydrogen con-
centration distribution in the reactor building. Hy-
drogen detonation studies have been performed.
An analysis of structural response will be finished
by 2002. The concern is that containment penetra-
tions might be damaged due to hydrogen combus-
tion phenomena outside the containment which
could lead to a large leak.
Primary system depressurization in severe
accidents
To secure depressurisation of the reactor primary
system in severe accident situations and to pre-
vent a new pressurisation of the reactor, two
valves of the relief system have been modified. It
is now possible to keep the valves open with the
help of nitrogen supply or water supply from out-
side the containment. The modification was fin-
ished in 1999.
Recriticality
The SIRM detectors will be drawn in the begin-
ning of the accident half a meter below the active
core to detect possible recriticality. Analyses were
performed in 1999 to determine how to relate the
reading of the SIRM monitors to actual reactor
power.
4 Qualification of
nondestructive testing
Organisation of qualification in Finland
The two utilities (TVO and Fortum Power and
Heat Oy), the major Finnish inspection companies
and VTT established a working group (nowadays
steering committee) to outline a Finnish qualifica-
tion system considering national objectives, pur-
poses and situation. The principle was that no
new qualification organisation should be estab-
lished for these activities in Finland. The availa-
ble resources and organisation should be integrat-
ed into the qualification system for inservice in-
spection in Finnish nuclear power plants. The doc-
ument “The qualification of inservice inspections”
outlines the principles followed in Finland in the
qualification of pre- and inservice inspections of
nuclear power plant components. The document is
a living document and will be updated with expe-
riences gained from first inspection qualifications.
The document fulfils the recommendations of Eu-
ropean methodology for qualification of non-de-
structive tests, second issue (ENIQ) 15.1.1997.
Organisation structure of inspection
qualification
The utility has an overall responsibility for the
performance of the inservice inspections. The
steering committee is nominated by the utilities.
For each qualification task the steering committee
nominates and establishes a qualification body on
the initiative of the utility. The steering commit-
tee receives an order from the utility for the quali-
fication of an inspection, or a part of it.
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Steering committee
The steering committee has an important role in
inspection qualification. The main tasks of the
steering committee are:
• nominate the members of the qualification body
for each qualification after assessing their
technical competence
• approve the level of qualification based on the
safety relevance of the inspection item
• assure that the qualifications follow establis-
hed practices
• improve and develop the qualification practices
for nuclear power plant components in Finland
• organise and specify additional annual trai-
ning arrangements for the inspectors.
Qualification body
The members of the qualification body are level 3
experts on a specific inspection technique. One is a
representative of the Finnish National Qualification
Body and, if needed, the others are experts from
utilities or research institutes. The level 3 mem-
bers or the expert members of the qualification body,
usually from Finnish inspection vendors or utili-
ties, must be independent in relation to the organ-
isation that is taking part in the qualification.
The representative of the Finnish National
Qualification Body, who is completely independ-
ent, informs and reports directly to STUK about
the work of the qualification body. The main
activities of the qualification body are:
• produce the qualification procedure based on
the level of qualification approved by the stee-
ring committee
• assess the technical justification and the
inspection procedure used in the qualification
• prepare and supervise the qualification
• issue qualification certificates
• issue a report summarising the implementati-
on of the qualification and the invigilations and
the checks performed during the qualification
• approval of test blocks.
Utility
The utility has the overall responsibility for the
performance of the inservice inspections and also
for the verification of the efficiency of inspections.
The utility is also responsible for applying for the
acceptance of different tasks from STUK. The in-
spection items for which qualification will be car-
ried out are proposed by the utility. All input data
necessary for the qualification will be submitted
to the qualification body and to the inspection ven-
dor by the utility.
The utility is also responsible for the prepara-
tion of the inspection procedure and the technical
justification used in qualification. Normally these
documents are prepared by the inspection vendor.
The utility is responsible for the procurement
of the test specimen needed in the practical tests
as well as for the reservation of the facilities and
resources necessary for the performance of qualifi-
cation.
Situation of TVO’s inspection qualifications
The first totally qualified inservice inspection doc-
uments have been submitted to STUK for approv-
al as a pilot project.
5 Sharing of experience
TVO’s operating experience feedback group con-
sists of 6 members and 3 advisors. This onsite
group gives recommendations to the line organisa-
tion that makes decisions on eventual corrective
actions. The industry operating experience from
similar reactor types is followed by several means.
The main sources of information are ERFATOM,
KSU, WANO and Forsmark. These are explained
in more detail below. Information is also coming
directly from several sources (IAEA and OECD/
NEA (IRS), Loviisa power plant (e.g. operating ex-
perience meetings and reports), vendors (Westin-
house Atom, Alstom Power Sweden AB), compo-
nent manufacturers, the WANO Network,
BWROG (BWR Owners Group).
ERFATOM was founded by the Swedish utili-
ties and TVO as a consequence of the so called
Barsebäck incident (July 1992). Activities started
on January 1st, 1994 in the premises of former
ABB Atom (Västerås, Sweden). Nowadays ERFA-
TOM is part of the NOG (Nordic Owners Group)
and issues reports every two weeks and topical
reports when needed. ERFATOM also gives rec-
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ommendations. ERFATOM co-operates very close-
ly with KSU (Swedish nuclear training and safety
center). KSU concentrates on operational safety
issues and they have the responsibility to screen
out external (international) operating events. ER-
FATOM screens out internal events from Swedish
Nuclear Power Plants and from Olkiluoto.
TVO is a member of WANO (World Association
of Nuclear Operators). Although KSU screens out
important events reported through the WANO
Network, TVO reviews independently all the SO-
ERs (Significant Operating Experience Reports)
and SERs (Significant Event Reports) reported by
WANO. Forsmark units 1 and 2 in Sweden can be
called as “sister units” of OL1 and OL2. Reports
from Forsmark 1 and 2 (e.g. licensee event re-
ports) and minutes of the meetings of the Fors-
mark safety committee are reviewed regularly.
In addition to the above, TVO participates
actively in WANO programs and in several inter-
national technical groups (such as valve group,
reactor group and turbine group) which have
regular meetings about twice a year.
6 Development of the handling
of modification procedures in
Olkiluoto
The modification handling procedure in Olkiluoto
has been under continuous development since the
early 1980’s.
After the modernisation program and several
reviews of TVO’s working methods, experiences
have been collected in a separate development
project. The project was realised during the years
1997–1999 and it had participants from operation,
maintenance, quality assurance, safety, modifica-
tion planning and refuelling planning. Special
attention was placed also on the new modern
automation and on modifications during the field
installation phase.
The project started with exploring
1. The working procedure at present state.
2. Comments relevant to the modification pro-
cedure collected from the audit results of TVO’s
working methods:
• TVO’s internal audit 1997
• modification procedures; a comparison
between FKA (Forsmark) and TVO, done by
VTT Automation
• assessment of the QA-system of a nuclear
power plant, done by SFS Sertifiointi
• human errors related to maintenance and
modifications, done by VTT
• STUK’s inspection A2, handling of safety
questions
• study on the control of modification work,
done by VTT
• time scheduling of modification work by
TVO
• development of modification process from
year 1996, done by TVO
• international benchmark on safety review
practices at nuclear power plants, done by
VTT.
3. Experiences from the modernisation program
of OL1 and OL2.
On the basis of the results of the above mentioned
studies and other experiences, about 60 remarks
on the state of the modification process were col-
lected to be taken into account in the development
work. The target state was defined and it was also
checked that all remarks had been taken into ac-
count. In addition, many new ideas were found by
the project group itself.
In the development work, detailed procedures
were defined making the decision process more
exact and taking into account the opinions of all
parties in TVO´s organisation. Some of the most
significant modifications made included:
• enhanced information flow on modifications
within TVO
• procedure for surveys to use the knowledge of
the whole TVO-organisation and to enable also
safety organisation to analyse the safety signi-
ficance already in the early stage of the project
• better commitment of personnel responsible for
the work
• consideration for independent review on modi-
fications
• establishment of a basic plan for system modi-
fications and more exact specification for sys-
tem level pre inspection material
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• enable comments for the modification process
in early stage
• more exact content for the modification plan
pointing out environmental matters, training,
commissioning, spare parts
• principle of continuous improvement
• better follow up for modification process prog-
ress
• consideration of changes to the plant documen-
tation in an early stage.
The practice has shown that there is still need for
continuous improvement to keep the personnel
motivated and to take into account all aspects to
guarantee safe and reliable long term operation of
the power plant.
General training, discussion and development
seminars have been arranged to continue the
modification process development and to get the
working organisation committed to the new proce-
dure.
7 Quality assurance program
TVO has developed and re-structured the quality
assurance program for operation during the past
three years.
The main objectives for the development of the
quality assurance program have been:
• to enlarge the scope of the quality management
system in practice to all processes
• to describe and manage operational functions
and the interactions on the basis of the pro-
cess-approach
• to make the documentation easier to find and
use
• to establish and implement the procedure for
the continual improvement
• to increase the level of nuclear safety.
During the development work on the quality man-
agement system, the requirements from the fol-
lowing documents have been taken into account:
• YVL 1.4 Quality assurance of nuclear power
plants, 20 Sep. 1991
• YVL 1.9 Quality assurance during operation of
nuclear power plants, 13 Nov. 1991
• International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety
Series No. 50-C/SG-Q, Quality Assurance for
Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and other
Nuclear Installations and
• ISO 9001:2000, Quality management systems.
As a result of the development work, TVO has
established a new quality management system the
description of which has been published as a qual-
ity management manual, internally called Per-
formance Manual (Toimintakäsikirja).
The present Quality Assurance Manual of op-
eration has been the Quality assurance program
of the licensee accepted by STUK on the basis of
Guide YVL 1.9 Quality Assurance during Opera-
tion of Nuclear Power Plants. TVO has published
the internally accepted quality management sys-
tem at the beginning of the year 2001. The re-
quirements of the present Quality Assurance Man-
ual of operation are still valid.
TVO has delivered to STUK for approval a plan
for the replacement of the present Quality Assur-
ance Manual with a new Quality management
system.
TVO has delivered to STUK for approval a
general description of the new quality manage-
ment documents needed on the bases of Guide
YVL 1.9 Quality Assurance during Operation of
Nuclear Power Plants. After approval by STUK
the new quality management system will replace
the present Quality Assurance Manual as the
operational Quality assurance program of the li-
censee.
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Background
The term “Safety culture” was first introduced af-
ter the Chernobyl accident by the International
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG). Experts
from Finland were involved in drafting the report
of Safety culture (INSAG-4, 1991), and it was pos-
sible to develop the national regulations on this
topic concurrently.
The nuclear legislation in Finland was totally
renewed in late 1980’s. The revised Nuclear Ener-
gy Act (1987) and Nuclear Energy Decree (1988)
include i.a. the basic safety prerequisites, the
licensing procedures and requirements for nuclear
waste management. Safety culture was formally
included in the Finnish nuclear safety regulations
in the Decision of the Council of State on the
“General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear
Power Plants”, valid since 1st of March 1991.
According to Section 4 of the Decision:
“When designing, constructing and operating a
nuclear power plant an advanced safety culture
shall be maintained which is based on the safe-
ty oriented attitude of the topmost management
of the organisations in question and on motiva-
tion of the personnel for responsible work. This
presupposes well organised working conditions
and an open working atmosphere as well as the
encouragement of alertness and initiative in or-
der to detect and eliminate factors which en-
danger safety.”
The essential cornerstones of nuclear safety cul-
ture in Finland are the commitment of the Gov-
ernment, the Regulatory Organisation, and the
Users of Nuclear Energy (utilities).
Government
Safety culture cannot be established in an atmos-
phere of uncertainty. Therefore the Government
has to ensure a predictable and smooth evolution
of the national nuclear energy programme. In Fin-
land this has been achieved by:
• specific nuclear energy legislation including
clear duties, responsibilities and rights of va-
rious organisations
• provision of information to the public
• clear commitment to the safe disposal of
nuclear waste
• clear liability for nuclear accidents
• basic nuclear training in technical universities
• national research programme covering all rele-
vant aspects of nuclear safety
• adequate resources for the regulatory organi-
sation
• participation in international co-operation to
gain access to state-of-the-art knowledge.
Regulatory organisation
The regulatory organisations are often seen as
“watch dogs” that control their “customers” on be-
half of the general public. This is certainly one of
their roles, but an important duty of the regulator
is to support and foster the good safety perform-
ance and safety culture of the Users. In the work
of the regulatory body ( STUK) it is strongly em-
phasised that the Users of Nuclear Energy bear
full responsibility for safety, and that true respect
should be given to their views and proposals. Also,
STUK strives to develop and maintain an exem-
plary safety culture in its own organisation. This
aim is realised e.g. in the following principles of
the quality system:
• clear organisational and personal commitment
to the priority of safety
• logical and predictable regulations and beha-
viour in general
• frank and balanced relationship with the Users
of Nuclear Energy
• questioning attitude towards one’s own work
and the influences of separate actions on the
culture of the power plants and
• knowledge of the state-of-the-art in the nuclear
safety field.
Users of Nuclear Energy
An ultimate responsibility for safety and a strive
for excellence, rather than the fulfilment of writ-
ten rules, should be reflected in all arrangements
of the User organisation. Following this line the
Users in Finland have a steady investment pro-
gramme with the aim to keep the plant status and
operation at least at the level of the first start-up,
and to improve reliability and safety. The Users
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have mainly set their own performance standards
for activities they find most important to reliable
and safe operation. The investments made in the
training of the personnel have been at a high level
and cultural aspects have been covered beside
technical and operational themes.
The detection and removal of safety problems
can only be done in an open atmosphere where all
technical problems and human errors can be re-
ported without a fear of negative consequences to
individuals or the User organisation in general.
Continuous attention requires the question, how
to maintain the spirit of private initiative and the
sense of personal responsibility beyond the statu-
tory tasks of each individual among the Users’
staff. An observation from the Finnish Users is
that all arrangements fostering professional pride
among the individual workers are important con-
tributors to addressing this issue.
Introduction and assessment of
safety culture by the regulatory
body
Practical work for the systematic introduction and
fostering of safety culture was started immediate-
ly after the Council of State had issued the new
safety regulations in early 1991. Training was or-
ganised to all engineering and supervisory staff of
both power plants as well as to the personnel of
the regulatory body, with the experts of STUK
giving the lectures.
After the Decision of the Council of the State
on the “General Regulations for the Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants” had entered into force,
STUK made an assessment on how it was re-
ceived at the operating nuclear power plants. A
Safety Evaluation Memorandum on the safety
culture at the Loviisa nuclear power plant was
issued on May 3, 1991, and a corresponding mem-
orandum on the situation at Olkiluoto nuclear
power plant was issued on January 14, 1992.
These memorandums discussed 13 concrete topics
of safety culture.
An evaluation of the level of safety culture of
the licensees was included in the renewal of oper-
ating licenses in 1998. The evaluation was based
on the licensees’ reports on their safety culture
and also on STUK’s observations in this area. In
conclusion, a safety culture complying with the
provisions of section 4 of the Decision of the
Council of State of 1991 (cited above) was main-
tained by both licensees.
The essential characteristics of a good safety
culture have gradually been incorporated in the
Finnish regulatory guide system (YVL Guides).
Especially guides concerning Quality Assurance,
Operating Experience Feedback and the Qualifi-
cation of Plant Personnel provide requirements
related to a good safety culture. It is foreseen that
during the process of updating the YVL guide
system, the issue will be further addressed and
emphasised to provide more practical guidance.
Safety culture has also been an essential topic
in STUK’s continuous interaction with the power
plants. The top level inspection of the periodic
inspection programme, called “Safety Manage-
ment”, includes an assessment of safety culture
issues and quality management. In addition,
STUK has emphasised that the strengths and
shortcomings of safety culture are determined in
quality assurance audits and root cause and other
event analyses. Findings related to safety culture
from different inspections, audits and event anal-
yses are analysed in STUK and discussed in a
yearly meeting between the senior managers of
the nuclear power plant and the regulatory body.
STUK in 1999 increased the resources allocated
for this task by founding a new organisational
unit, called “Human and organisational factors”,
in the Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Presently, STUK is explicating the goals and ac-
tions relating to safety culture into a coherent
national safety culture policy.
STUK has striven to develop and maintain an
exemplary safety culture and to concretise the
concept in everyday action. In the 80’s and early
90’s this aim was related to the development of
quality manuals. After the most recent organisa-
tional change in spring 1997, the systematic de-
velopment of a uniform quality system was start-
ed. Today, the quality manuals of STUK and
specifically those of the Department of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation document both managerial
guidance and memory of the organisation by de-
scribing the operational practices that are experi-
enced as good and recommendable. A good quality
manual
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• ensures a consistent approach to all activities
• reduces the need to “re-invent the wheel” by
describing approved practices in handy forms
• facilitates orientation of the new staff members
by describing principles, meanings and policies
in a comprehensible way, and
• is easily updated when better practices are
proposed and approved.
As a means for the further development of opera-
tion and safety culture, STUK has initiated sever-
al internal audits, self-assessments and independ-
ent assessments of its activities. The management
system and work processes have been internally
assessed with criteria of Quality Award twice
(1996 and 2001). The methods used in event anal-
ysis were externally evaluated in 1999. The gener-
al coverage, consistency and prescriptivity of the
regulatory guide system (YVL Guides) were stud-
ied in 2001 (see Annex I of the report). Experienc-
es and opinions related to regulatory practices
were collected in systematic interviews during
1998. A full-scope IRRT mission was conducted by
the IAEA in March 2000. Questionnaires concern-
ing job satisfaction and management practices are
used regularly. Lately, the safety culture as a
whole has been the subject of conscious assess-
ment and development within the scope of a study
carried out within the FINNUS research pro-
gramme (2000; see below). As a result of these
projects, development projects have been intro-
duced some of which have already been imple-
mented.
Manifestation of safety culture at
Finnish nuclear power plants
Experience has shown that a safety culture can
not be implemented in a separate action or only by
written instructions. The roots of safety culture
are in the national culture and in the values of
organisations and individuals. Evidence of a
strong safety culture should be visible in the daily
activities of the plant and it’s supporting organisa-
tions. In the following, a few examples of topics
are mentioned, which manifest safety cultural ele-
ments at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
• Recognition by the top management of the fact
that the atmosphere in all organisations is
essentially created by their attitudes and prac-
tical examples and that it is manifested in
their direct involvement and keen interest in
matters concerning safety as well as quality
assurance.
• Implementation of a number of projects to
maintain and improve the knowledge and skills
of the organisation and individuals, needed for
the reliable and safe operation of the plants,
the modifications and modernisation of techni-
cal equipment and changes ongoing in the
nuclear field.
• Continuous and well tailored re-training pro-
grammes for all personnel levels to maintain
staff motivation, and also to give forum to
promote new ideas.
• Continuous assessment, development and up-
dating of quality assurance manuals and pro-
cedures is important in preserving the credibi-
lity of the QA-system.
• Establishment of systematic methods to utilise
operating experience from own plants as well
as from other relevant sources through partici-
pation in relevant international organisations.
• Importance of housekeeping issues in all Fin-
nish plants as of the start of operation.
• Measures to promote a positive atmosphere
and the motivation of the personnel.
• Exchange of information and especially com-
munication of planned plant activities within
the organisation.
• Direct contacts between the technical person-
nel of the utilities and STUK are frequent, and
the importance of frank relations is empha-
sised by the management.
• Detailed self-assessment of safety culture, dis-
cussion of the results in the management
group, and implementation of the necessary
improvements; discussion and improvements
also on the basis of inspections made by the
regulatory body as well as findings and recom-
mendations gathered from assessments of cor-
responding units abroad.
Research on safety culture in
Finland
The Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear
Power Plant Safety FINNUS (1999–2002) aims to
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enhance the safe operation and maintenance of
nuclear power plants The programme consists of
research areas including ageing, accidents, and
risks. Research related to human and organisa-
tional factors within FINNUS is called WOPS
(Working practices and safety culture in nuclear
power plant operation). The co-ordination group of
WOPS represents relevant safety critical organi-
sations and researchers in Finland, as well as the
utilities and STUK, in order to strengthen the
exchange of information. The research work is
conducted by the Technical Research Centre of
Finland, VTT.
Since 1999, VTT has been developing a meth-
odology for characterising, assessing and develop-
ing organisational culture in safety critical organi-
sations. When used together with an integrated
conceptual modelling of the task and analysis of
actual performance, safety culture can be de-
scribed. A case study was conducted at STUK in
1999. The analysis consisted of a document analy-
sis, interviews, a survey and a workshop for the
whole staff of a department. A further assessment
of the used method was carried out after the case
study was concluded.
The results of the case study indicated a strong
need for the clear understanding of one’s own
tasks in relation to the whole and a need for
communication and feedback at both individual
and organisational level. The perceived future
threats were related to bureaucratisation and a
loss of meaning felt in one’s work. The regulatory
culture is composed of three occasionally conflict-
ing roles, the authority role, the expert role and
the public role. The roles set conflicting demands
to both the organisation and individuals, such as
flexibility and creativity versus control and rigid
obedience to rules. The employees of STUK valued
professional knowledge, openness, courage, fair-
ness, efficiency, a questioning attitude, teamwork
and independence. The results and conclusions of
the case study were broadly considered in discus-
sions organised within the Department of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation and developmental actions
were carried out.
The organisational culture research methodol-
ogy, although still under development and discus-
sion, is considered suitable for use by both regula-
tory agencies and nuclear power plants. For fur-
ther development of the methodology, a new case
study is underway (2001-2002), focusing on main-
tenance at Finnish nuclear power plants. In addi-
tion to national projects, there has been interna-
tional co-operation as part of Nordic Nuclear Safe-
ty Research (NKS), in which a safety culture
interview study was conducted at Finnish and
Swedish power plants. The results of the 1999
study were presented at a NKS-seminar.
